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INSTANT (GENDER) MESSAGING: EXPRESSION-BASED 

CHALLENGES TO STATE ENFORCEMENT OF GENDER 

NORMS 

by TAYLOR FLYNN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Statements of identity, without more, have long been a potent form of demand 
for inclusion and equal treatment. I Consider the signs carried by workers, most of 
whom were African American, during the 1968 Memphis sanitation strike during 
which Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated.2 They read, quite simply, "I 
AM A MAN."3 Or, consider the rhetorical question posited more than one hundred 
years earlier at the 1851 Women's Convention by Sojourner Truth, "Ain't I a 
woman?"4 Both deploy statements of identity as a demand for racial equality.5 Nor 
is it coincidental that both are framed in terms of gender: to be gendered as male or 
female is to be considered fully human. It is one's humanity that serves as a point 
of access to demand equal treatment. 
As the terms "gender" and "identity" suggest, most challenges to state­
enforced conformity with gender norms are almost solely status-based equality 
claims.6 Given that a common term deployed by members of the trans community 
• Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. 
I. For a thoughtful and well-theorized account of what the author terms claims of "expressive 
identity," see generally Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. I (2000) [hereinafter Hunter, Expressive Identity]. 
2. See Laurie B. Green, Race. Gender. and Labor in I960s Memphis: 'I Am a Man' and the 
Meaning of Freedom, 30 J. URB. HIST. 465, 466-68 (2004) (analyzing the political and cultural 
significance of the strike and its slogan, "I AM A MAN"). 
3. Id. at 465. 
4. See generally BELL HOOKS, AIN'T 1 A WOMAN? BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (\981) 
(discussing the role of black women in the context of the women's rights movement). 
5. See Green, supra note 2, at 468 ("Most broadly, 'I AM A MAN' drew on a political language 
that considered manhood a universal signifier of humanity and independence, rejecting racist images 
that cast blacks outside humanity or marked them as household dependents."); HOOKS, supra note 4, at 
1-13. 
6. See. e.g., Qz'etax v. Ortiz, 170 F. App'x 551, 552 (10th Cir. 2006) (Trans prisoner asserted 
equal protection claim against state department of corrections because it treated inmates diagnosed and 
treated for gender identity disorder prior to their incarceration differently from those diagnosed after 
their incarceration.); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729,735 (6th Cir. 2005) (Trans plaintiff who 
suffered adverse employment action asserted Title VII and equal protection claims against state 
employer.); Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 547 (8th Cir. 1980) (Trans Medicaid claimant asserted 
equal protection and due process claims against state department of social services after it denied her 
[465] 
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and in antidiscrimination laws is "gender identity and expression,"7 situating such 
challenges in expression may, at first glance, appear to be little more than linguistic 
legerdemain. An understanding of gender as expressive, however, helps capture an 
often unarticulated, yet central aspect, of the harm enforced conformity inflicts on 
trans persons---compelled expression of the state's gender message over their 
profound objection. Consider governmental insistence that a trans student or 
employee present herself, through dress and grooming, in accordance with her sex 
assigned at birth. The state is enforcing a selective message, which this Article 
refers to as "the ideology of the binary." Unsurprisingly, it reflects the prevailing 
view: there are two (and only two) distinct sexes with congruent gender identities, 
fixed by nature and immutably different.8 
This coerced conformity, moreover, concerns an aspect fundamental to us all. 
Our gender identity is central to the ways we understand as well as present 
ourselves to the world; it is crucial to our health and well-being. Gender, and what 
it presumptively says about us-{mr sexuality and sexual orientation, our place in 
the multilayered hierarchy ranging from gubernatorial aspersions cast on "girlie­
men"9 to a female presidential candidate denominated "one of the boys"l0­
touches a raw nerve because it provides a myriad of social meanings about our 
position(s) in the world. 
It remains true, of course, that the binary model of sex captures the experience 
of most people, who identify comfortably with the sex assigned them at birth. In 
the majority of cases, the state's enforcement of this model is an umemarkable use 
of legislative and administrative generalizations, necessary to enable the state to 
govern effectively. In addition, the categories "male" and "female" importantly 
enable the government to recognize and redress, through mechanisms such as 
Medicaid benefits for sex reassignment surgery.). I am not a betting person, but I would venture my 
(albeit meager) savings that· when the government (for instance, as employer or educator) requires an 
individual to conform, over her objection, to gender norms, a lawyer's initial reaction is likely to be 
framed in terms of gender role stereotyping rather than freedom of expression. 
7. See, e.g., N.Y., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(23) (2008) ("The term 'gender' shall include actual 
or perceived sex and shall also include a person's gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior or 
expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression is 
different from that traditionally associated with the legal sex assigned to that person at birth."); R.l. GEN. 
LAWS § 28-5-7 (2008) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on "gender identity or 
expression"); see also Transgender Law & Pub. Policy Inst., Non-Discrimination Laws that Include 
Gender Identity and Expression, http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/index.htm# (last visited May 
13, 2009) (listing the number of jurisdictions that prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity). 
8. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223,230 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) ("The male chromosomes 
do not change with either hormonal treatment or sex reassignment surgery. Biologically a post­
operative female transsexual is still a male."). 
9. Peter Nicholas, Schwarzenegger Deems Opponents 'Girlie-Men' Twice, S.F. CHRON., July 18, 
2004, at A7. 
10. Roxanne Rivera, Opinion, Nine Ways Hillary Clinton Could Win the Presidency, ELDR, Feb. II, 
2008, http://www.eldr.comlarticle/politics/nine-ways-hillary-clinton-could-win-presidency (last visited 
May 13, 2009) (stating that "Hillary [Clinton] should resist the urge to become one of the boys and 
should embrace the femininity that helps her stand out from the pack"). 
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antidiscrimination laws or affinnative action, hanns created by the privileging of 
male over female, including efforts to punish gender nonconformity. This Article 
does not argue that the state cannot categorize people as "male" or "female," nor 
that the state is required to create additional categories to accommodate individuals 
whose gender identity falls outside of those descriptors (though the latter, in my 
view, is nonnatively desirable). 
The focus of this Article is on compelled expression over an individual's 
objection, which is of particular concern given the state's role as enforcer. Not 
only does the state have sole authority to legally categorize people by sex, but it 
also uses those categories as the basis for distributing rights and goods, such as 
marriage and its associated benefits, over which it maintains a monopoly of power. 
The state likewise controls access to the countless protections that flow from the 
wide-ranging use of government identification in our private interactions, such as 
the ability to get a job, use a credit card, or interact with the public and government 
authorities without fear of harassment, discrimination, or violence. Case law, 
furthennore, reveals that state enforcement of gender nonns over one's objection is 
inextricably intertwined with additional messages concerning the subordination of 
gender outgroups. This messaging has as its foci the dehumanization of trans 
people, the insistence on traditional gender roles for women, and the disapprobation 
of homosexuality. II 
Gender expression challenges also may have the potential, albeit over the 
course of years, to benefit non-trans identified claimants. Sex role stereotyping 
cases by trans plaintiffs at times meet with greater success than do those involving 
what some might view as "garden variety" sex discrimination, such as the 
requirement that female employees confonn to a feminine gender presentation by 
wearing makeup. 12 It may seem ironic that such claims can fail where those by 
trans litigants have succeeded. I3 However, it is precisely because gender nonns and 
anatomical sex are for most persons congruent and binary that the decidedly non­
congruent and non-binary nature of sex and gender is invisible to the majority. 
Referring to this apparent paradox as seeing "pink on pink," this Article draws on 
insights from critical race theory and argues that courts have difficulty reading the 
expression of and, crucially, hann to non-trans identified women because their 
message is rendered invisible against the background nonn ofgender conformity. 
Expression claims are neither a panacea nor substitute for challenges based in 
autonomy or equality. A legal claim is but a jurisprudential approximation of the 
constitutional values at stake, whether of equality, liberty, or free expression. And, 
as with all rights- and identity-based claims, each of the three has serious flaws. 
Flaws notwithstanding, the nonnative prescription proposed in this Article can be 
encapsulated in a single word: more. 
II. See infra text accompanying notes 69-98 (discussing consequences of state-enforced sex-gender 
ideology). 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 69-98. 
13. See infra notes 209-229 and accompanying text. 
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This Article proposes a long-tenn vision. Today, a person can identify herself 
as female, have breasts, a vagina, a woman's body mass and muscle strength, have 
no measurable amount of testosterone in her body, and be otherwise 
indistinguishable in social interactions from any other woman, yet the vast majority 
ofjurisdictions will declare her legally to be male. As an initial matter, there needs 
to be more understandings of gender reflected in the law. This Article focuses on 
expression because it offers the opportunity of more. In contrast to the most 
common jurisprudential vehicle--equality--expression may better reflect the 
complex and flourishing diversity of experiences that make up gender. In 
particular, while equality claims tend to rely almost solely on a medical model of 
gender identity, expression claims are also suited to non-medicalized claims by 
trans persons, especially those for whom dissent from traditional nonns is integral 
to their gender identity. 
Part I considers gender within the context of the interwoven nature of equality, 
autonomy, and expression, and asserts that First Amendment claims have the 
potential to more fully represent a range of gender identities not comfortably 
captured by the predominant rubric of equality. Part II discusses the ideology of 
the binary. First, it examines ways in which state enforcement-not only of gender 
roles but also the state's view of sex itself--constitute expression. Part II then 
demonstrates through case law that while the overarching message sent by the state 
is its insistence on sex as a fixed binary, this message is often interwoven with a 
tapestry of a prescriptive ordering, one that subordinates women, trans individuals, 
and gay persons. 
Part III considers two highly schematized accounts of claims for inclusion by 
trans individuals. The first represents the bulk of legal challenges and relies on a 
binarized, medicalized understanding of gender variance. The second are claims 
for inclusion outside of, and often in resistance to, a binarized and medicalized 
experience of gender. The nonnative aspiration proposed in this Article is for 
advocates to pursue expression-based claims within and outside of a medical 
model. Part IV considers "the stuff of lawyers' work," examining obstacles to 
potential symbolic and compelled expression challenges. 
Lastly, Part V draws on what has been referred to as the "transparency 
phenomenon" in critical race theory: the understanding that the background, 
majoritarian nonns associated with whiteness are transparent to the white majority 
because of their ubiquity. Applying this to the failure of gender claims by non­
trans identified women, this Part suggests that courts fail to recognize the hann in 
some traditional "pink" gender role stereotyping cases because that hann is 
invisible when viewed against the "pink" background nonn of feminine gender 
confonnity. I conclude that trans expression claims may offer the possibility, over 
time, of making the invisible (more) visible, enabling courts to better see, for trans 
and non-trans identified persons, the hanns of state-enforced confonnity with 
gender nonns over an individual's objection. 
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I. GENDER AT THE CROSSROADS: EQUALITY, AUTONOMY, AND EXPRESSION 
It would be hard to capture the intertwined nature of equality, autonomy, and 
expression in a Venn diagram: three circles with a common ground of overlap 
would be far too neat to capture the complexities of this relationship. A rich, 
scholarly literature examines many of these interconnections; it suggests, and I 
agree, that the constitutional values underpinning these guarantees are not easily 
severable, and that the doctrinal drive to do so has lead to significant drawbacks. 14 
Nan Hunter, for instance, identified the development of a "new branch of equality 
law" that she called "expressive identity" claims, which she described as "an 
equality challenge in which the identity cannot easily be separated from a 
message."15 Central to Hunter's analysis is the inseverability of identity from 
expression inherent in these claims: expressive identity claims are at once 100% 
status and 100% expression. 16 Similarly, Kenneth Karst described the right of 
intimate association as an "organizing principle" that "retlect[ s] various hues on the 
constitutional spectrum" of free expression, equal protection, and both procedural 
and substantive due processP 
The normative desirability of taking a more synthetic, intratextual approach to 
the Constitution often accompanies a discussion of the hybrid nature of such 
rights. IS Although I endorse such an approach, it is unnecessary to consider here: 
First Amendment claims can be brought as a supplement to or in place of equality 
or autonomy claims; each basis is sufficient in se. For the purposes of this Article, 
this tripartite interconnection is significant because the underlying values are 
precisely those at stake in gender recognition cases. Chief among these values are 
the development of autonomy and self-actualization; protection of minorities 
(whether based on viewpoint or status); encouragement of diversity (among 
individuals, groups, and views); and corresponding protection of the democratic 
processl9 (as in Justice Stone's most famous offootnotes).2o 
14. For in-depth, thoughtful analyses of the inter-related nature of these protections, see, for 
example, Nan D. Hunter, Escaping the Expression-Equality Conundrum: Toward Anti-Orthodoxy and 
Inclusion, 61 OHIO ST. LJ. 1671 (2000) [hereinafter Hunter, Escaping the Expression], analyzing the 
relationship between the right to equality and freedom of expression, and Kenneth L. Karst, The 
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624 (1980) [hereinafter Karst, Intimate Association], 
discussing the constitutional and social issues involved with establishing a "freedom of intimate 
association." See also Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 20, 23 (1975) ("The principle of equal liberty of expression underlies important purposes 
of the first amendment."). 
15. Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. 
REv. 1591, 1592 (2001). 
16. See, e.g., Hunter, Escaping the Expression, supra note 14, at 1672. 
17. Karst, Intimate Association, supra note 14, at 625. 
18. See, e.g., id. (discussing the "pliable quality" of the freedom of intimate association and its 
relationship to other constitutional doctrines). 
19. See generally Hunter, Escaping the Expression, supra note 14, at 21 (discussing interests at 
stake in expression cases); Karst, Intimate Association, supra note 14, at 629-47 (analyzing the values 
that intersect the freedom of intimate association). 
20. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting the need for 
heightened scrutiny for all three clauses when necessary to check majorities' attempts to hijack the 
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While gender-based expression claims face some substantial jurisprudential 
hurdles and present difficulties of their own, they obviate others that are entrenched 
in liberty- and equality-based claims.21 Because the bulk of gender claims rely on 
an antidiscrimination, rather than autonomy model, this Part considers common 
failings of an equality approach only. Importantly, though, this Part does not argue 
that First Amendment challenges should supersede those based in equality or 
autonomy. Determinations such as whether and upon what ground or grounds to 
bring a claim are at the heart of lawyering. The suitability of, say, an 
antidiscrimination claim in conjunction with, or separate from, an expression-based 
challenge turns on familiar considerations, such as the interaction of fact and 
doctrine, the venue (administrative or judicial), and the wishes of the client. 
Encompassed within these, however, is a consideration that may be less familiar: 
the role of a client's gender identity. In attempting to address the basis of her 
claim, it is inestimably important that the claims brought and the manner of 
discussing them best reflect the client's self-understanding. While far from perfect, 
expression-based claims have the potential to more fully represent a range of 
gender identities not comfortably captured by the predominant antidiscrimination 
rubric. 
In a growing minority of jurisdictions, an antidiscrimination framework for 
gender recognition claims has met with considerably greater success relative to 
other doctrinal accounts.22 Significantly, however, such wins have primarily 
benefited trans persons whose bodies and lives most closely resemble traditional 
norms-heterosexual individuals whose gender identity reflects a binary 
understanding of sex and who have undergone surgical reconstruction so that 
anatomy and identity are in alignment. Because the limits of equality claims have 
been analyzed extensively elsewhere,23 this Subsection briefly sketches three 
shortcomings: first, a jurisprudential rejection, by and large, of an antisubordination 
approach to equality in favor of an insistence upon an Aristotelian model; second, 
the paradox that a plaintiff must claim a particular (fixed) identity even if her 
identity is more fluid or if the heart of her claim is a rejection of categorization in 
toto; and third, equality's presumption of a formal disavowal of state-enforced 
discrimination,24 in contrast to the First Amendment's distrust of government 
political process at the expense of minorities). 
21. See infra Part V. 
22. See, e.g., Franklin H. Romeo, Note, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New 
Conception of Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 713, 717 n.13 (2005) 
(discussing strategies used by some jurisdictions to protect "transgender and gender variant people"). 
23. See generally Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The Limits of 
Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83 (2008) (discussing various 
paradigms to view discrimination claims raised by trans persons); Romeo, supra note 22 (discussing the 
models by which trans persons may raise claims for discrimination and the barriers to redress they 
encounter). 
24. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 324-26 (1987) (discussing ways in which assumption of the 
"perpetrator perspective" requiring conscious invidious intent in disparate impact cases presumes a 
backdrop of non-discrimination). 
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power with respect to claims of state-enforced orthodoxy. For each, these 
difficulties may be minimized by a shift in focus to expression. 
A. An Aristotelian Approach Particularly Fails Trans Individuals 
As feminist scholarship has emphasized, the Aristotelian 
"sameness/difference" approach of ensuring that similarly situated individuals are 
treated similarly means that there is often no protection for those deemed 
"different"-frequently the very people most likely to be targets of 
discrimination.25 The command of treating "likes" alike can be especially 
damaging for trans persons. Among courts refusing to recognize a person's 
identified gender, a common (and dehumanizing26) rationale is that trans 
individuals are neither truly male nor truly female, and hence not "like" non-trans 
men and women. In denying a marriage application where one party was trans, an 
appellate court summed it up succinctly, stating, "[The court below] violated 
neither of the applicants' equal protection rights. Rather, it was treating like cases 
alike and unlike cases accordingly . ... In other words, this case was not the usual 
case ...."27 Precisely because an understanding of trans identity is based on 
individuals' variance from gender norms, the Aristotelian approach all but ensures 
that claims by trans persons will rarely, if ever, be deemed "the usual case." 
The polarity of difference, moreover, is presumed to mean something, and that 
something often has an hierarchical cast. An Aristotelian methodology not only 
fails to protect those deemed different, but it also glosses over a larger question­
different from whom? As Catharine MacKinnon argued, the framework assumes as 
its baseline the norms of the dominant group, against which the claims of the 
subordinate group are measured.28 This is particularly true when it is a sex-based 
difference, understood within the prevailing account of essentialized binarism29­
what the Supreme Court has termed the "inherent differences" between men and 
women.3D 
These differences were framed as a "cause for celebration" by the Court in 
striking down the ban on women attending the all-male Virginia Military Institute 
in United States v. Virginia (VMl).31 The Court's celebration of these differences, 
however, reflects a deep cultural investment in policing the gender lines. 
25. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 225-27 
(1989). 
26. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. 
27. In re Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *4 
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003) (emphasis added). 
28. MACKlNNON, supra note 25. 
29. For an in-depth discussion of the naturalized, binary model of sex, and my argument that it 
represents a form of ideological expression, see infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text. 
30. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. SIS, 533 (\996) (,"[I]nherent differences' are no 
longer accepted as a ground for race or national origin classifications. Physical differences between men 
and women, however, are enduring ....") (internal citation omitted). 
31. 518U.S.515,533. 
472 TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:2 
Following on the heels of VML just four years later, the more oppressive aspects of 
this investment were revealed in Tuan Anh Nguyen v. Immigration and 
Naturalization ServiceY There, the Court deployed "our most basic biological 
differences" to justify unequal access to citizenship.33 As this result suggests, a 
legal framework ostensibly dedicated to sex equality, but one that permits reliance 
on the purportedly exogenous fact of natural differences, is, to put it mildly, a 
porous one. 
An Aristotelian approach obscures the extent to which the purportedly neutral 
baseline in fact reflects the very norms a claimant may be challenging. When a 
norm is so ubiquitous, it ceases to look like a norm; it simply becomes part of the 
background-part of "the way things are." With respect to sex discrimination, 
MacKinnon explained, "Concealed is the substantive way in which man has 
become the measure of all things. Under the sameness rubric, women are measured 
according to correspondence from man . . . . Gender neutrality is the male 
standard."34 The dominant norm is rendered invisible; the markedness of 
masculinity has disappeared. Similarly, enforced compliance with gender role 
stereotypes may be especially likely to disappear for non-trans identified 
individuals.35 Consider, for instance, the gender norm of women wearing make-up. 
While not all women wear make-up, a walk into any drugstore or five minutes of 
television will attest to the norm's robustness. As discussed in Part II, expression­
based gender recognition claims may help bring the background norm into relief.36 
B. Fixed Identity Categories, Fluid Identities 
Another shortcoming of an equality model is especially relevant for trans 
individuals who identify as agendered or bi-gendered, or for whom their gender 
identity is in other ways fluid. Postmodern scholarship contends that the demands 
of equal protection jurisprudence reify identity-to make a claim, a litigant must 
identify herself in a way that corresponds to the pre-ordained confines recognized 
by the law.37 Trans plaintiffs in successful sex discrimination cases typically 
identify as transsexual and as either (uniquely and solely) male or female, an 
identity that conflicts with their sex assigned at birth.38 For those whose identity is 
not fixed, making a claim as only "male" or "female" could require a plaintiff to 
32. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
33. Id. at 73. 
34. MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 225-27. 
35. See infra notes 210-219 and accompanying text (discussing a Ninth Circuit case in which the 
court rejected the plaintiffs Title VlJ discrimination claim, unable to take seriously the harm 
experienced by the plaintiff in being forced to conform to traditional gender norms). 
36. See infra notes 53-68 and accompanying text (explaining the use of gender and sex as forms of 
expression and advocating for increased-use of expression-based challenges because doing so captures 
an important element of the harm experienced by the transgender individual making the claim). 
37. Gilden, supra note 23, at 85-86. 
38. See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008) (ruling in favor of 
transsexual plaintiff's Title VlJ sex discrimination claim, emphasizing medical testimony); Enriquez v. 
West Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 370 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (discussing "plaintiff's 
gender dysphoria or transsexual ism" in employment discrimination case). 
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undergo an injury similar to the one she is attempting to redress. Postmodem 
scholarship posits that the process of asserting identity-based claims is not merely 
Machiavellian: although she may adopt an identity for the purpose of a lawsuit, the 
very act of adoption and the understanding of oneself as wronged based on that 
identity is arguably disciplinary and constitutive.39 
Related to the reliance on a fixed, binarized assertion of gender, successful 
cases typically rule in favor of trans litigants based on a biologized or medicalized 
identity.40 These rulings frequently emphasize the medical profession's designation 
of gender dysphoria as a medico-mental health condition.41 In addition, these cases 
often also focus on the extent, if any, of surgical intervention.42 For persons 
wishing to have the law recognize their identified gender under an equality model, 
there is a pragmatic drive towards reliance on a medical model.43 As discussed 
below, expression claims with the greatest likelihood of success are those that 
likewise rely on a medical model. Nonetheless, I argue that expression claims offer 
claimants who reject reliance on a medical model an opportunity for success that is 
effectively foreclosed by status-based claims. 
In addition to any individual harm, the process of claiming a biologized and 
medicalized identity may serve to re-inscribe the very categories the plaintiff is 
seeking to challenge. Consider an example that may be more familiar-the law's 
classificatory response to and re-inscription of race-based difference.44 Homer 
Plessy's suit, for instance, was not framed as a direct chaUenge to segregation, but 
rather, as a claim of mis-categorization: in essence, he argued that he was white and 
not black; therefore, he belonged in the whites-only car.45 Homer Plessy's claim 
can be read, particularly thorough a contemporary lens, for more radical meanings. 
It may be seen not only as a chaUenge to segregation, but also as a rejection of 
state-enforced racial categorization as weU as the biologized construction of race. 
39. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 
140 (1990) (re-theorizing feminism's relationship to identity by applying Foucauldian notion of 
productive, disciplinary power); Brenda Cossman, Gender Performance, Sexual Subjects, and 
International Law, 15 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISISPRUDENCE 281, 282-83 (2002) (discussing Judith 
Butler's performative theory of gender). 
40. See supra note 38 (discussing Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, and Enriquez, 777 A.2d 365). 
41. See Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 370 (explaining plaintiff's gender dysphoria by reference to her own 
mental impressions in addition to current medical research relating to the development of the brain). 
42. See, e.g., id. at 368-69 (discussing the plaintiff's transition from male to female as beginning 
with her external transformation in appearance and ending with her surgical procedure). 
43. See Romeo, supra note 22, at 724-30 (noting courts' increasing reliance on the medical model to 
grant at least some basic legal protection for transgender litigants and attributing such reliance on 
medical regulations becoming more visible and uniform); see also infra notes 98-124 and accompanying 
text (discussing expression identities that both reject and rely upon the medical model). 
44. The oppressive history of race discrimination raise challenges that are at once distinct from and 
importantly intersect with the oppression arising from discrimination based on sex or gender, with 
severe violence and marginalization inflicted on trans people of color. See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A 
Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection ofRace and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 372-76 (\991). 
My focus here is on the vicious circle created by the state's creation of, and litigants' challenges to, race 
and sex-based classification systems. 
45. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896). 
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Significantly, the law's structure meant that Mr. Plessy had to frame his claim 
within the confines of racial identity as envisioned by those in power at the time. 
He thus was required to run the risk that a successful claim would reproduce even 
(and ever) more intricate levels of racial apartheid, as courts determined how much 
"whiteness" was "white enough" to fit the racial identity standards of the day. 
History revealed that such rulings, nonetheless, became part of the legal landscape 
as courts adjudicated whiteness and blackness for others who did not fit neatly into 
a racial binary.46 
In a similarly biologized fashion, trans men, for instance, are asked highly 
intrusive questions concerning penis length in an attempt to determine how much 
"maleness" is "male enough."47 And the many trans individuals whose gender 
identity does not fit neatly into a male-female binary must nevertheless frame their 
claims within the confines of this model. An expression claim does not eradicate 
the need for sex-based categorization, and I do not argue that the state is required to 
supplement or otherwise change its binary rubric: I assume, arguendo, that plaintiff 
ultimately seeks recognition as either "M" or "F."48 Deploying expression as the 
means to achieve that end, however, shifts the focus to the particular message that 
the trans person was sending regarding her gender identity.49 A shift of this nature 
may allow for a more encompassing discussion of the claimant's individual gender 
variance. Particularly given that law and identity tend to act over time as a 
"feedback loop," this may, in tum, slowly mise awareness that there are many 
possible narratives and experiences of gender. 
C. Equality's Search for the "One Bad Apple" 
First Amendment law is arguably more suspicious of government power than 
are the vast majority of cases involving sex discrimination claims. For the latter, 
where there is no facial sex-based classification, but where discriminatory impact is 
overwhelming,50 the law is disturbingly unsuspicious of government power. As 
critical theorists have discussed, equality law in disparate impact cases in effect 
46. See, e.g., In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774, 774-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (deciding whether multi-racial 
petitioner was of "African descent"); see also Hernandez v. State, 251 S.W.2d 531, 535 (finding that 
Mexicans "are members of ... [the] white race as distinguished from ... the Negro race" and declining 
to fmd jury selection cases with respect to African American jurors applicable), rev'd, 347 U.S. 475 
(1954). 
47. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (detailing the intrusive nature of some of the 
questions asked oftransgendered plaintiffs). 
48. See, e.g., Smith, 378 F.3d at 570 (factually portraying plaintiffs gender identity as complex yet 
designating plaintiff as a male for the purposes of outlining a prima facie case of employment 
discrimination). 
49. See, e.g., Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3 (finding plaintiffs particularized message to be her 
identification with the female gender as evidenced by her dressing in clothing traditionally associated 
with the female gender). 
50. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979) (upholding veteran's 
preference for civil service promotions, even though ninety-eight percent of veterans are male, on 
ground that heightened scrutiny applies only where plaintiff can prove that state acted "because of," 
rather than "in spite of' an intent to discriminate). 
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presumes that there has been a formal disavowal of gender discrimination by the 
government. Instead, applying what is often called by critics a "perpetrator 
perspective," the law attaches liability only in those rare cases where the plaintiff 
can point to the presumably exceptional evildoer who acted with conscious 
discriminatory intent. 5I Gender discrimination thus is portrayed as an anomalous 
rather than as an on-going threat. 
Expression jurisprudence, in contrast, reflects a deep and abiding skepticism 
of governmental regulation of expression. Inherent in the structure of the First 
Amendment is concern with the use of state power to coerce conformity, and a 
corresponding reliance on the amendment's guarantees as a bulwark against 
totalitarianismY As discussed in greater detail in Parts II and III below, expression 
claims may help move the analysis away from equality's status-based conflation of 
anatomy as designated at birth with gender identity and expression. Instead, First 
Amendment challenges have greater potential to shift the focus to the reasons for 
the government's regulation of the plaintiffs gender expression, including the 
imposition of the state's own sex-gender ideology. 
II. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE BINARY 
A. Gender and Sex as Expression 
As the scholarly literature attests, the understanding of gender as expressive is 
anything but new. 53 A person's gender presentation (as masculine, feminine, 
androgynous, multiple, or fluctuating) occurs against a backdrop of shared social 
and cultural understandings of what it means to be male or female. The words 
"sissy" and "tom-boy" are a testament to our collective ability to "read" gender and 
interpret failures to conform to gender norms. Central to any consideration of 
gender theory is Judith Butler's preeminent work on the performativity of gender.54 
Butler argued that we all perform our gender: gender exists through the repeated 
performance of it, which legitimizes and substantiates it through its continual 
51. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. 429 U.S. 252, 563-65 (1977) 
(setting forth a limited number of situations in which a plaintiff may be able to prove invidious intent); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (l976) (holding that a showing of disparate impact would 
not be sufficient to establish an equal protection claim, instead requiring discriminatory intent on the 
part of the state actor); see also Lawrence, supra note 24, at 324-25 (discussing the requirement that 
there must be discriminatory intent to bring a claim for equal protection). 
52. See, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("!fthere is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith therein."). 
53. See Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal 
Conceptualization of Gender that Is More Inclusive of Transgender People, II MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
253, 276 (2005) ("Gender is expression-physical, mental, spiritual, sexual, inter-relational, connective 
expression .... Gender is that expressive, relational, embodied self."). 
54. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing Judith Butler's theory of gender 
performativity). 
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(re)enactment and expression.55 Gender norms, moreover, are ideological 
expressions.56 Some may object to the characterization of gender as ideology. 
However, with its focus on the societal roles expected of men and women, the 
content and contours of concepts like "masculinity" and "femininity," and the 
gender identity and presentation of persons who transgress gender norms, gender 
itself is a study of ideology, precisely in the sense contemplated by Merriam­
Webster.57 
The dominant view of sex as binarized and essentialized likewise is ideology. 
Gender theory has long understood this. Butler argued that it is through the 
performance of gender that our notion of sex is produced: these repeated gender 
performances instantiate sex as "natural," binary, and heterosexual. Sex and gender 
thus function as norms which themselves produce the bodies that are governed. As 
Butler states, sex is not a "static condition of a body, but a process whereby 
regulatory norms materialize."58 
Those skeptical of gender theory may find a medical evaluation of sex to be 
more convincing. If asked to explain sex differentiation, most of us would refer 
immediately to biology, drawing perhaps on the filmstrips we saw in sex or health 
education class in junior high school-a discussion of boys and girls, distinguished 
by chromosomal make-up, genital and other reproductive anatomy, the 
development of secondary sex characteristics-all presumed to line up, along with 
one's gender identity, unproblematically. As an initial matter, medical and 
scientific communities overwhelmingly would corroborate this view: as we all 
know, the first governmental record of our lives begins with a doctor's genital 
check of a newborn and the "M" or "F" on our birth certificates. Because this view 
is deceptive in its apparent ubiquity, it is important to note that sex and gender 
dualism has not been the sole method of ordering our world: cutting across cultures 
and time-periods, more capacious views of sex and gender, often characterized by 
inclusion ofa third sex, have emerged. 59 
55. BUTLER, supra note 39, at 140. 
56. See generally David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1001, 
1007, n.44 (2002) (describing "gender fundamentalism" as the belief that men and women are, and 
should be, fundamentally different and noting that "[t]he sex/gender system then is something of a 
misnomer, as a sex/gender system might be regarded as just another term for a gender ideology"); Ariela 
R. Dubler, In the Shadow ofMarriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction ofthe Family and the 
State, 112 YALE LJ. 1641, 1644 (2003)(describing the traditional model of marriage as premised on the 
gendered model of male providers and female dependents); Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal 
Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and Judicial Identity, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 329, 339-52 (1999) 
(discussing gender as ideology). 
57. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary/ 
ideology (last visited May 13, 2009) (defining "ideology" in one definition as "a manner or the content 
of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or CUlture"). 
58. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX" 2 (1993). 
59. Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law 
and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REv. 265, 275-78 (1999). From the Native American recognition of persons 
known as two-spirit or berdache, to Hiljas in India, to the recognition of intersex children in certain 
regions of the Dominican Republic and Papua New Guinea, societies have recognized and continue to 
recognize what is frequently referred to as a third sex, persons typically possessing both male and 
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In spite of contemporary western society's initial narrative of sex, however, 
these same doctors, when pressed for a more detailed explanation of sex, would 
convey a picture that is far less tidy. Millions of people do not fit neatly into an 
"M" or "F" category. Experts, for instance, estimate that one in every 1500 to 
2000 babies is born intersexed, having some combination of anatomical, hormonal, 
and/or chromosomal characteristics that are neither clearly male nor female. 60 For 
infants born with ambiguous genitalia, the ability of social norms to literally 
construct sex is at its most stark. In a practice that denies intersex children the 
ability to identify their own gender later in life and to control their reproductive 
capacities and sexual functioning, many doctors continue to routinely undergo 
surgery on the newborn. The child's sex is determined by the medical 
establishment's heterosexist assumption that men must have a penis capable of 
penetrating a vagina: if the infant has a developed but undersized penis, the child is 
often surgically constructed into a girl and given female hormones.61 
For these intersexed children, women are constructed (figuratively and 
literally) as "men minus." As one specialist stated, "In the absence of maleness, 
you have femaleness."62 While precise numbers are not known, due in part to a 
fear of exposing oneself to discriminatory treatment, estimates concerning the 
incidence of intersexuality and transsexual ism range from one-half of one percent 
of the population to four percent; there are, in addition, many other individuals who 
identify as transgender or are in some way gender variant.63 This essentialized tale 
of two sexes with congruent gender identities is ideological because it is a selective 
slice that ignores what is known about the larger understanding of sex. Although 
many people fall within a binary model, the full range of sex differentiation is 
anything but binary-with some researchers, positing multiple sexes or describing 
sex as a continuum along a male-female spectrum.64 Still others, particularly those 
female qualities. Id. at 275-76. Other cultures and contexts have also recognized a third sex, including 
in early English law and in some Jewish and other religious texts. Id. at 277-78. 
60. Intersex Soc'y of N. Am., How Common Is Intersex?, http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency (last 
visited May 13, 2009). 
61. See generally Julie A. Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race and Sex Categories: A 
Comparison ofthe Multiracial and Transgendered Experience, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917, 934 (2002) 
[hereinafter Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race] ("Therefore, if an XY infant is born with a penis 
that is less than 2.5 centimeters when fully stretched, the XY infant is surgically and honnonally turned 
into a girl, despite the fact that this treatment may deprive the person of the ability to reproduce as an 
adult male and the fact that the child's eventual gender identity may well be male."); Suzanne J. Kessler, 
The Medical Construction ofGender: Case Management ofIntersexed Infants, 16 SIGNS 3, 9-17 (1990) 
(discussing how doctors should proceed when detennining the sex of an "intersex" baby); Catherine L. 
Minto et aI., The Effect of Clitoral Surgery on Sexual Outcome in Individuals Who Have Intersex 
Conditions with Ambiguous Genitalia: A Cross-Sectional Study, 361 LANCET 1252, 1256-57 (2003) 
(discussing negative effects of intersex surgeries on women including inability to orgasm). 
62. Kessler, supra note 61, at 15. 
63. Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race, supra note 61, at 927 n.53. 
64. Some researchers, for instance, have posited that there are five sexes; others refer to sex as a 
continuum, an infinite number of points along a male-female spectrum. See ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, 
SEXING THE BODY 78-79 (2000) (describing five sexes: traditional male, traditional female, henn (true 
hennaphrodite with both an ovary and a testis), menn (pseudo hennaphrodite with ovaries but 
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who focus on gender identity as the detenninant of sex, view sex not as a binary or 
continuum, but as an infinite number of points in a three-dimensional world, a kind 
of "hyper-space" of sexual identities that includes, among many others, persons 
who are bi-gendered, non-gendered, and androgynous.65 
While my own view is most aptly conveyed by the latter, I am not concerned 
with arriving at a definitive understanding of sex, if such a thing were even 
possible. Nor do I do not mean to imply that the rights of trans individuals tum on 
the number of people affected or on whether there may be some biologic basis for 
an individual's gender variance. In fact, even the understanding of what constitutes 
biological sex is contested, particularly with respect to the etiology of gender 
identity.66 To the contrary, the common understanding of the distinction between 
sex and gender, in which the fonner is privileged as natural and more authentic or 
"real" than gender, is itself ideological. For my purposes, the most important 
distinction concerning sex and gender is precisely that the two are not distinct. Our 
conception of what constitutes a biological male or female is as socially 
constructed, contingent, and laden with political and cultural meaning as our 
conceptions of masculinity, femininity, and "appropriate" gender roles. An 
understanding that dichotomizes sex and gender, privileging the fonner, in 
conjunction with the insistence on (an again hierarchical) male-female binary, is 
what I refer to as "sex-gender ideology."67 
While in the majority of cases, the state's enforcement of this model is an 
unexceptional use of administrative generalizations, my focus is on instances in 
which an individual is legally categorized as male rather than female, or vice versa, 
over that person's objection. I urge an increased use of expression-based 
challenges both because expression captures an important element of the harm to 
trans individuals and because it properly directs attention to the role of the state in 
traditional male genitalia), and fenn (pseudo hennaphrodite with testes but traditional female genitalia)); 
Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race, supra note 61, at 927-35 (exploring race classification systems 
and their effects on multiracial individuals and using these systems and their effects to enlighten a 
discussion of the effects of binary gender classification on transgendered people). 
65. See, e.g., Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Relmodeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 
15, 29-30 (2003) (advocating for policy which would recognize "diverse gender expression and 
identities"); Vade, supra note 53, at 273-78 (describing a non-linear "gender galaxy"). 
66. Researchers are increasingly rejecting an older model that posits intersexuality as more 
biological in origin than transsexual ism, which is typically described in tenns of a person's 
psychological discomfort with her anatomical sex, based on a gender identity different from that 
assigned at birth. See generally Peggy T. Cohen-Kettenis, Henriette A. Delelmarre-van de Waal & 
Louis J. G. Gooren, The Treatment ofAdolescent Transsexuals: Changing Insights, 5 J. SEXUAL MED. 
1892, 1892-97 (2008), available at http://www.imatyfa.orginewsl08sep-cohen-kettenis-jsm2008.pdf 
(describing the changing policy relating to gender identity disorders as a response to the changing 
understanding of the biological basis for such understanding). While the precise etiology of gender 
identity is not known, many experts point to a significant biological basis, influenced by a complex 
mixture including pre-natal honnones, genetics, and fetal brain development. /d. As a result, 
researchers are increasingly characterizing transsexualism as an intersex condition. Id. 
67. For these reasons, I at times use the tenns "sex" and "gender" interchangeably (most typically 
employing the tenn "gender" in ways that may sometimes encompass what some may understand to 
constitute anatomical sex) as well as in combination. 
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enforcing a selective message about sex and gender. Trans people of course face 
difficulties created by private as well as state power. Nor is "the state" a 
monolithic entity; it consists of judgments by individuals that reflect, by and large, 
the social narrative of sex. The state, however, not only maintains a monopoly of 
power to legally categorize people by sex, but also uses those categories to 
distribute benefits such as those related to· marriage over which it likewise 
maintains monopolistic authority. Furthermore, it controls access to government 
identification, affecting an infinite array of private and governmental interactions, 
and placing trans individuals with non-conforming I.D. at risk of harassment, 
discrimination, or violence.68 
B. State-Enforced Sex-Gender Orthodoxy and the Subordination ofOut groups 
Federal, state, and local government agencies enforce their own selective sex­
gender ideology on a daily basis, deeply touching all aspects of an individual's 
life-from the issuance of passports, driver's licenses, and birth certificates, to 
petitions for legal name changes, to the enforcement in forty-six states of the 
mixed-sex requirement for marriage, and the determination of legal parenthood.69 
Judicial opinions illustrate the myriad ways in which refusal to recognize a 
person's identified sex is expressive, and the pronouncements are remarkably 
consistent. The overarching statement is insistence on sex as a fixed binary. 
Intertwined within this is a message of subordination (and superordination) with 
respect to three gender-based outgroups: persons who are trans (rather than gender­
conforming); female (rather than male); and gay or bi (rather than heterosexual). 
The first is typically communicated through a portrayal of trans people as non­
natural, dehumanized, and "other." The subordinate position of women is 
frequently expressed by an emphasis on whether a trans woman can adequately be 
sexually receptive to a penis. The last is an anti-gay insistence on heterosexuality 
as an integral component of one's identification as male or female. The result is a 
tapestry of a prescriptive ordering, with the same threads often communicating a 
message of disapprobation of these outgroups simultaneously. 
The expression of trans people as a non-natural and de-humanized is the 
corollary to the view of sex as immutably created by nature or, as implied in a few 
decisions, by divine authority. As David Cruz argued, "gender may effectively be 
conceptualized on the model of religion," each functioning as ideology, with resort 
to extra-human authority as an underlying justification for the particular form of 
social organization for each. 70 One appellate court, for instance, framed the 
recognition issue before it as whether "a person's gender [is] immutably fixed by 
our Creator at birth,"7! responding in the affirmative by concluding, "There are 
68. Romeo, supra note 22, at 715. 
69. See id. at 715-16 (noting that government aid programs are designed to condition assistance on 
personal decisions of recipient, including job choice and family structure, based upon what legislatures 
define to be socially desirable). 
70. Cruz, supra note 56, at 1005-06. 
71. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224 ("The deeper philosophical (and now legal) question is: can a 
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some things we cannot will into being. They just are."72 Whether from God or 

nature, this essentialized view of sex leads almost ineluctably to a comparative 

. portrayal of persons outside this schema as unnatural or non-human. As the 

sanitation workers' claims to manhood73 and Sojourner Truth's assertion of her 

womanhood74 powerfully convey, to be gendered is to be fully human. 
An Ohio appellate decision refusing to issue a marriage license to a trans man 
and his female partner, In re Marriage License for Nash,75 illustrates the way in 
which assertion of sex-gender ideology almost inescapably involves intertwined 
messages of subordination with respect to trans persons, women, or gays.76 The 
court opened by fleetingly acknowledging that a fixed, binary view of sex does not 
represent the complete picture, stating: "[w]e recognize that there are people who 
do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized category of male or female,"77 but 
insisting nonetheless on the fixed, essentialized view that "one's gender at birth is 
one's gender throughout life."78 The court then quite literally portrayed trans 
women and men as neither male nor female by reading them out ofOhio's marriage 
statute, finding it inapplicable on the ground that "the 'words' ... 'male,' and 
'female' ... do not encompass transsexuals."79 The court, as have others, further 
treated gender transition as a matter of humor or ridicule, noting that, for male-to­
female genital surgery, "'amputation is a pretty important step. "'80 
In a circular move that perpetuates heteronormativity, the Nash court reasoned 
that Nash's original female-designated birth certificate was evidence sufficient to 
rebut the prima facie case of maleness established by his amended, male-designated 
birth certificate, even though the amended certificate was issued for the very 
purpose of replacing the original.8l Then, after relying on the original birth 
certificate as conclusive evidence of his sex, the court invoked Ohio's anti-gay 
marriage ban as a shield. The court refused to grant full faith and credit to the 
amended birth certificate on the ground that to do so would violate Ohio's public 
policy against same-sex marriage, thereby simultaneously asking and answering the 
question before it.82 
physician change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling, or is a person's gender 
immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?"). 
72. Id. at 231. 
73. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
74. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
75. Nos. 2002-T-OI49, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095. 
76. Id. at *9. 
77. Id. at *7 (quoting In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 137 (Kan. 2002». 
78. Id. at *9 (quoting Gajovski v. Gajovski, 610 N.E.2d431, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991». 
79. /d. at *6 (quoting Gardiner, 42 PJd at 135). 
80. Id. at *8 (quoting Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230-31); see also Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 
160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) ("Assuming ... that defendant was a male entrapped in the body of a 
female, the record does not show that the entrapped male successfully escaped to enable defendant to 
perform male functions during marriage." (quoting Frances B. v. Mark, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 717 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1974) (internal quotation marks omitted». 
81. Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *5. 
82. Id. 
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Unlike the cases discussed below, the majority in Nash does not directly 
express messages that place women in a subordinated role. The Nash dissent, 
however, rather bluntly got to the heart of the majority's sex-gender ideology by 
comparing the majority's decision to infamous cases upholding sex discrimination 
based on the view of women as inherently different from men. Referring to the 
majority's conclusion that trans individuals are neither truly male nor female, the 
dissent likened it to the statement in Muller v. Oregon83 that a woman 
"[d]ifferentiated ... from the other sex ... is properly placed in a class by herself 
. . . . "84 This status as immutably different is what made legally acceptable the 
"plethora of paternalistic legislation and judicial decision making based on 
'indisputable' natural law and thinly veiled religious dogma that portrays women 
and other folk as fragile and somewhat moronic creatures incapable of protecting or 
thinking for themselves."85 For the dissent, it is the notion of essentialized 
"otherness" that perpetuates subordination. 
Even some courts that recognize a person's identified gender may do so in a 
way that perpetuates sex role stereotypes. Particularly for cases challenging the 
validity of a marriage in which one spouse is trans, courts typically consider the 
parties' ability to engage in heterosexual intercourse, grounded in notions about the 
proper role and use of women's and men's bodies.86 It may initially seem 
unproblematic for a court determining the validity of a heterosexual marriage to 
consider the parties' ability to engage in heterosexual intercourse. That 
determination, however, presents a highly troubling use of state power, fraught 
with threats to equality and liberty. The state must posit what heterosexual sex 
looks like, which is rife with potential for gender role stereotyping and, when 
applied to the couples before the court, is breathtakingly invasive. 
Courts that adopt an essentialized sex-gender binary are uniform in their 
insistence on a "missionary" model of heterosexual sexuality-one in which the 
man's role is distilled to penetration and the woman's role to passive receptivity. 
Moreover, the court's sensationalist and prurient prying into the couple's sex life is 
reminiscent of the oppressive wielding of state power through sodomy laws, ruled 
unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas. 8? Transgender marriage trials have included 
weeks of testimony-some of which have been broadcast nationwide-on the 
sexual positions and practices of the couple, detailed descriptions of the trans 
83. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
84. Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *11 (Christley, J., dissenting) (alteration added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Muller, 208 U.S. at 421-22). 
85. Id. at *10 (citing Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924)). 
86. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Joy and John R., No. E039132, 2007 WL 2319143 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Aug. 15,2007) (in determining whether the marriage was based on fraud the court heard and considered 
evidence of sexual relations between the couple). 
87. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). For evaluations of the impact of Lawrence v. Texas in the context of sex­
recognition cases, see Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex 
Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1184 (2004); Nancy J. Knauer, 
Lawrence v. Texas: When "Profound and Deep Convictions" Collide with Liberty Interests, 10 
CARDOZO WOMEN'S LJ. 325 (2004); Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Civil 
Unions After Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. LJ. 1265 (2004). 
482 TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RlGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:2 
person's genitalia, and questions such as whether he or she urinates while seated or 
standing.88 This intrusion into the deeply personal aspects of one's intimate 
relationship is compounded by the enforcement of prescribed gender roles. For 
trans women, the focus, as framed by one court, is whether she has a "normal" 
vagina that could "function as any female vagina,"89 which the court defined as 
being for the purpose of "traditional penile/vaginal intercourse."9o For trans men, 
courts inevitably focus on whether the man has a penis deemed large enough for 
penetration, such that intercourse with his wife could be adjudicated sufficiently 
heterosexual.91 The state's insistence on male penetration and female penetrability 
sends messages, respectively, of activity and passivity, dominance and 
subordination.92 In short, the use of state power to intrude into one's intimate life, 
with its insistence that sexuality be performed within the confines of traditional 
gender roles, targeted solely at an unpopular group, is a stark reminder of the 
interconnected nature of autonomy, equality, and expression. 
In an unusual case, one court reversed itself on rehearing, directly 
acknowledging that it had overstepped in these realms.93 At issue was a trans 
woman's petition for a name change. Cynthia Frank was caught in an all-too 
common catch-22 for people who are transitioning: she sought the name as part of 
her gender reassignment protocol-a protocol typically required by the medical 
"gatekeepers" who control access to gender reconstructive surgeries, but the court 
denied her petition until "completion" of surgery.94 This left Frank in gender 
transition purgatory, unable to get a name change until she transitioned and unable 
to transition without the name change. To this the court added a second 
requirement-that Frank get divorced as a prerequisite to the name change.95 The 
court stated, "It would ... be inconsistent for this court to grant the relief requested, 
88. See, e.g., Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 227 (comparing the sexual habits and history of the trans 
defendant and her plaintiff husband with those described in previous trans cases). 
89. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 206 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
90. Id. 
91. See, e.g., Taylor Flynn, The Ties that (Don 'f) Bind: Transgender Family Law and the Un­
making ofFamilies, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 32, 37-39 (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Huang & Shannon 
Minter eds., 2006) (discussing dehumanizing, sexist, and heterosexist aspects of courts' hyper­
sexualizing inquiries concerning trans claimants' genitalia and sexual relations). 
92. See, e.g., id. at 71 (noting that "[w]hi1e the court includes a discussion of [plaintiff's] life 
experience with (relative) sensitivity, its exaltation of male penetration of women has the effect of 
reducing [plaintiff] to little more than a receptacle for intercourse and her marriage to little more than 
the missionary position"). 
93. See In re Guido, 771 N.Y.S.2d 789, 790-91 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003) (noting that the court's 
previous inquiry into sex-reassignment surgery and the status of the petitioner's marriage was 
"misplaced"). 
94. Id. at 789-91. Trans people who desire surgery typically must undergo a protocol that includes 
the so-called "real life test," in which the person must live and work full-time in their identified gender 
for one year. In addition to the courts, other "gatekeepers" may include employers, who may insist on a 
legal name change before allowing the person to present herself at work in her identified gender. I put 
"completion" in quotes to highlight the fact that courts often require mUltiple surgeries to consider 
gender reassignment to be complete-surgeries that can be far more extensive, costly, and medically 
risky than the treatment a particular trans person deems appropriate for herself. 
95. Id. at 790 (quoting the earlier, unpublished order). 
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to permit the applicant to appear and represent himself as female, while in fact he 
remains in a legal relationship with his wife premised on his being male."96 In an 
impressive turnaround (albeit two years later), the same judge overturned her prior 
ruling and granted the petition-not because Frank had fulfilled either requirement 
(surgeries and divorce), but on the ground that these requirements were beyond the 
scope of a name change petition.97 Most importantly, the judge acknowledged that 
one function of her prior decision had been to send a message about appropriate 
gender roles: "The law does not distinguish between masculine and feminine names 
.... Apart from the prevention of fraud or interference with the rights of others, 
there is no reason-and no legal basis-for the courts to appoint themselves the 
guardians of orthodoxy in such matters."98 
III. ASSIMILATION, DISSENT, AND THE MEDICAL MODEL 
This Part examines the tensions at play in a trans person's assertion that state 
enforcement of gender conformity over her objection violates her right of free 
expression. While there is some reference to the doctrinal argumentation that is the 
focus of Part III, my emphasis here is on two highly schematized accounts of 
gender non-conformity as expression. Drawing on a tension historically (and I 
believe inevitably) at play in generations of civil rights movements, these are 
struggles of, respectively, assimilation and resistance.99 Mapping these broadly 
onto gender identity, the first are claims of inclusion, largely within a binarized 
understanding of gender. These constitute the bulk of legal challenges-plaintiffs, 
typically transsexual, whose claim and/or self-understanding can loosely be 
described as one of mis-categorization within the binary.loo The second are claims 
for inclusion outside of (and often in resistance to) a binarized understanding of 
gender. Not surprisingly, given the law's Aristotelian approach, there are no 
equality challenges (to my knowledge) that encompass the latter. As even a 
glancing familiarity with expression jurisprudence would suggest, however, an 
experience of one's gender identity that is simultaneously an assertion of resistance 
has the potential to be characterized as dissent, a value preciously guarded by the 
First Amendment. 
A. Assimilation and Resistance as Dissent 
Although protected expression need be neither political nor a form of dissent, 
protection is at its highest for political speech, with the closely related notion that a 
primary purpose underlying free expression is the protection of dissent. IOI The 
96. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting prior order). Frank's wife had already submitted 
to the court a sworn statement of consent to the name change. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 791. 
99. Hunter, Expressive Identity, supra note 1. 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 101-108 (explaining how an individual's resistance against 
the binary gender model is an expressive form of dissent). 
101. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 507 (1969) (prohibiting states from limiting political 
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expression of gender-nonconformity, as a pragmatic matter, is likely to be deemed 
too far afield from speech traditionally considered to be "political."102 By contrast, 
as suggested by the often hostile and at times viciously violent reactions of others 
to an individual's non-conforming gender expression,103 a court could find that this 
expression fulfills "a principal 'function of free speech [which] is to invite 
dispute[,] ... induce[] a condition of unrest, create[] dissatisfaction with conditions 
as they are, or even stir[] people to anger."I04 Gender presumptively positions us in 
the world along a variety of axes, including sex, sexuality, and sexual orientation; 
its power to invoke a visceral, almost primitive hostility when non-conforming is a 
testament to gender's instant messaging of myriad meanings about our place(s) in 
the social hierarchy. 
Both models posited above can be conceptualized as dissent. Consider a self­
understanding that perhaps most closely tracks the dominant view of sex and 
gender: a binarized mismatch of sex and gender identity, biological in origin and 
medically diagnosable. 105 This is a claim for inclusion arguably at its most 
assimilationist. Rather than characterizing the claim as one of resistance, it might 
be understood simply as an assertion of belonging. Most trans individuals seek 
nothing more (and nothing less) than access to the gender privileges enjoyed and 
usually taken for granted by non-trans persons. These privileges can include 
having the sex marker on their driver's license or birth certificate reflect their 
gender identity or the right to marry in accordance with their identified gender. In 
short, what many trans persons seek looks little like dissent: they seek access to 
norms and privileges, many of which are accessible only through the state and 
which are a prerequisite for individuals to function smoothly in society. Their 
claim is one of assimilation and they seek the legitimizing power of the state. 
As others have argued, when a member of a marginalized group asserts her 
right to be accepted within mainstream norms on an equal basis, that claim for 
equality is at once assimilative and an expression of dissent. Discussing occasions 
"when [subordinated] groups or identities seek inclusion or equal treatment and are 
resisted," Nan Hunter argued that this effort "is intrinsically a move against 
orthodoxy because they challenge the patterns of stratification and the ideology of 
dominance that undergirds those patterns."106 In short, she asserted, "Claims of 
equality based on identities of difference are intrinsically a kind of protest."107 
speech unless it is directed at inciting immediate lawless activity). 
102. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652,2674 (2007) (describing 
election-related advertisements as "pure political speech"). 
103. See S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, GENDER NEUTRAL BATHROOM SURVEY (2001), 
http://www.transgenderlawcenter.orglpdfi'sbac_survey.pdf. I in no way mean to suggest that gender 
variant people are somehow "inviting," or are in any other way responsible for the discrimination, 
harassment, and violence perpetrated against them. 
104. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1989) (alternations and omissions added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4 (1949». 
105. For a more in-depth discussion of the implications of reliance on a medical model, see infra Part 
III.B. 
106. Hunter, Escaping the Expression, supra note 14, at 1720. 
107. Hunter, Expressive Identity, supra note I, at 5. 
485 Spring 2009] INSTANT (GENDER) MESSAGING 
Although the simultaneity of assimilation and dissent may appear paradoxical, it is 
in fact a combination that may augur for success in the courts. Courts may more 
readily accept a message of "dissent"-particularly a transsexual's medicalized 
claim-precisely because it does not dissent "too much." In other words, the 
plaintiffs gender identity in such cases, while non-conforming, is-for better and 
for worse--comprehensible to the court because it fits within the mainstream sex­
gender rubric. 
B. Expression Encompasses Identities that Rely on and Reject a Medical Model 
The mainstream understanding of gender non-conformity is often conveyed 
via a medicalized model; in court, this typically consists of a claimant's reliance on 
a diagnosis of gender identity disorder (GID).108 Whether advocates should rely on 
a medical model is hotly contested within the trans community,109 and while I 
advert to the arguments briefly, an in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of this 
Article. For my purposes, the most important point is that a First Amendment 
approach may provide a greater opportunity for success for cases in which a 
medical model is not used and provides the flexibility of reliance on a diagnosis if 
that approach is preferred. Because First Amendment claims are predicated on the 
expression of views rather than directly based in identity, there is at least less of a 
doctrinal (as opposed to pragmatic) drive to prove the underlying "truth" or reality 
of one's views. My normative aspiration is for advocates to pursue expression 
claims both within and outside of a medical model. As discussed below, the 
decision whether to rely on a medical model may depend on a variety of factors, 
particularly the individual's level of comfort or disagreement with such a model. 
There are significant reasons to be wary of reliance on a medical model, 
particularly given that such reliance historically has been a source ofoppression for 
subordinated groups-the American eugenics movement, Nazism, and the 
involuntary sterilization of people of color and/or the poor via welfare programs in 
the 1970s are sadly but a partial list. llo Mental health diagnoses, such as 
108. See Romeo, supra note 22, 724-30 (discussing the medical model of gender as used by courts 
and its reliance of medical evidence, typicaJly in the form of psychiatric diagnosis of GID). See 
generally AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 532-38 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-fV] (defining gender identity disorder in children, 
adolescents and adults). 
109. Compare Spade, supra note 65, at 23-26 (discussing the dangers of the medical model of 
transsexuality), with Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don't Make the Man (or Woman), but Gender Identity 
Might, 15 COLUM. 1. GENDER & L. 90, 104 (2006) (advocating for bringing disability claims with gender 
discrimination claims writing that "[b]y incorporating a medical claim associated with one's gender ... 
courts can distance themselves from the particular facts ... and take seriously the dysphoria experienced 
by a plaintiff's forced conformity to gender norms."). 
110. See, e.g., Buck v. BeJl, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding involuntary sterilization of teenager 
claimed to be mentaJly disabled on the ground that "three generations of imbeciles are enough"); 
Matthew Lippman, The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o/the Crime o/Genocide: 
Forty-Five Years Later, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMPo LJ. I, 4 n.20 (1994) (noting that World War II 
provided Nazi Germany with an "opportunity to exterminate, enslave, or Germanize various European 
nationalities which were viewed as biological inferiors" (citing RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN 
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homosexuality, gender identity disorder, and gender identity disorder in children, 
arguably reflect little more than political horse-trading of marginalized identities in 
an attempt to enforce gender and sexual orientation conformity. II I Some argue that 
reliance on a medical model, particularly as a mental health diagnosis or disability, 
embraces and re-inscribes the notion that gender nonconformity is a stigmatic 
"sickness" to be "cured."112 Trans people, moreover, are particularly vulnerable, 
whether to being kicked out of their homes at a young age, fired from their jobs, or 
subject to stranger or intimate violence, resulting in a disproportionate number who 
are homeless, living in poverty, or caught in a cycle of sex work for survival 
followed by periods of incarceration. ll3 Multiply marginalized, many may not have 
access to health care, which some argue is an impediment to reliance on a medical 
model. 114 For others, reliance on a medical model does not reflect their lives, as 
their gender identities are not experienced as tied to biology or as otherwise 
essentialized; moreover, there is a risk that non-essentialized experiences of gender 
identity may be devalued or dismissed as inauthentic, particularly against the 
backdrop of medicalized claims. liS As discussed below, a claim based in 
expression may offer greater potential for success than equality-based claims for 
cases in which there is no reliance on a medical model. 
There are likewise significant reasons to rely on a medicalized model. For 
some, a medical model-whether through a GID diagnosis, experienced as a form 
of disability, or simply as biological in etiology-reflects their lived experience.116 
OCCUPIED EUROPE 80-82 (1944»); Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation ofMinorities'"; Race, Ethnicity and 
Reactionary Color Blindness, 59 STAN. L. REv. 985, 997 (2007) (noting that throughout the 1920s and 
into the 1930s courts and legislatures were committed to biological theories of inherent differences 
among different races in order to justifY legal oppression). 
Ill. See generally PHYLLIS BURKE, THE "PREHOMOSEXUAL" AGENDA 100 (1996) (discussing the 
increased use ofGID for children suspected of being gay). By "horse-trading of marginalized identities" 
I mean to say that one marginalized identity-being transgender (and being diagnosed as such through 
GID)-is replacing another marginalized identity-being gay. 
112. See, e.g., Levi, supra note 109, at 104-06 (arguing in favor of the use of disability claims for 
trans plaintiffs, but acknowledging the social stigma of being "disabled" as the primary objection to 
raising these disability claims); Spade, supra note 65, at 34 (expressing concern that "trans people do not 
want to be seen as 'disabled'" because it implies that to be transgendered is to be flawed). 
113. See Spade, supra note 65, at 17 n.5 (describing his own experience in witnessing the gravity of 
transgender vulnerability). 
114. Id. at 35 (arguing that lower income individuals will be denied protections available to wealthier 
individuals because they lack the resources necessary to access a GID diagnosis as a "diagnosable 
condition," which is necessary when courts utilize the medical model approach). But see Levi, supra 
note 109, at 107-08 (arguing in support of adding a disability claim to a gender discrimination claim and 
responding to the argument that a medical approach to claims of gender discrimination denies protection 
to lower-income individuals by stating that medical diagnosis is not necessary to prove the existence of a 
disability in most states). 
liS. See, e.g., Spade, supra note 65, at 19-23 (discussing author's experience of his gender identity, 
for whom resistance to a medical model is an integral part of his self-understanding, and who had 
difficulty accessing medical treatment because of his non-essentialized gender identity). 
116. I do not mean to argue that a medical model necessarily entails agreement with, or reliance on a 
disability model; what they share in common is some degree of reliance on a medical or biologized 
understanding of gender non-conformity. 
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One of my fonner transsexual clients, for example, is hearing impaired; in his self­
understanding, both his deafness and transsexualism are experienced as 
biologically-based and as disabilities.117 In his view, "disability" simply refers to 
variances from the nonn that may (or may not) require accommodation by those 
within the nonn, and he urges that the tenn be embraced by those who so identify: 
"The most disabling part of a disability," he said, "is other people's reactions to it, 
so I have no problem relying on disability anti-discrimination laws; I want to take 
the stigma out of the tenn 'disability,' rather than reject it because it is 
stigmatizing."1l8 Others have made similar arguments in the context of the 
language and jurisprudential interpretations of disability nondiscrimination laws.119 
Another reason, most likely the primary drive towards reliance on a medical model, 
is that it can assist a court in comprehending the nature of the hann of enforced 
confonnity to gender nonns-a hann that that may otherwise be unrecognizable or 
devalued by a judge for whom such confonnity comes seamlessly, with no 
discemable cost and no experience of hann. Jennifer Levi, for instance, argued that 
litigation wins for trans sex discrimination claims owe their success to the 
introduction of medical evidence that enabled the court to understand the deeply­
rooted nature of gender identity and provided the "judge a basis for removing ... 
herself as the evaluator of the hann,"120 making it possible for the judge to more 
fully comprehend "the sincere reasons why the plaintiff could not confonn to a sex­
differentiated dress requirement."121 
Consider first an expression challenge relying upon a GID diagnosis. Doe ex 
reI. Doe v. Yunits,122 one of the few cases to consider an expression claim, 
demonstrates the potential for success. Pat Doe, a trans teenage girl, designated 
male at birth and diagnosed with gender identity disorder, was effectively 
prohibited from enrolling in the eighth grade if she wore "girls' clothing or 
accessories" to school. 123 Undertaking a traditional symbolic speech analysis on a 
motion to dismiss, the court determined that there was a likelihood of success on 
the merits, given that testimony at trial would likely establish that her message was 
one of gender nonconfonnity.124 The court concluded, "[T]here is strong evidence 
that plaintiffs message is well understood by faculty and students. The school's 
vehement response and some students' hostile reactions are proof of the fact that 
the plaintiffs message clearly has been received."125 
117. Phone conversation with my fonner client, who requests anonymity (Jan. 30, 2009). 
118. Id. . 
119. See, e.g., Levi, supra note 109, at 105-107 (arguing, inter alia, that the legal meaning of 
"disability" in non-discrimination laws describes a health condition that does not preclude an individual 
from performing the essential elements of a job with or without accommodation, and that many such 
laws provide a cause of action for persons "regarded as" disabled, even ifnot in fact disabled). 
120. Id. at 104. 
121. Id.atlOI. 
122. No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199. 
123. Id. at *1-2. 
124. Id. at *3-4. 
125. Id. at *4. 
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The Yunits court was strongly influenced-maybe even moved-by the 
fundamental role that gender identity plays in our lives. It is evident, moreover, 
that the court came to its understanding of the integral nature of gender identity 
based, at least in part, on the diagnosing therapist's testimony.126 The court made 
multiple references to the therapist's testimony, focusing in particular on the 
evidence that expression of Pat' s l27 gender identity is essential to her health and 
well-being. 128 While I urge that claims also be brought without reliance on a 
medical model-and argue that First Amendment may be particularly well-suited 
for such claims where appropriate-the Yunits opinion suggests that clinical 
evidence can help judges understand that gender expression is, in the court's words, 
integral to an individual's "selfhood"129 and "a necessary symbol of [one's] very 
identity."I3O 
Now consider, for instance, Dean Spade's description-which, importantly, is 
not a description in any static, binarized sense-of his gender identity. In 
discussing his difficulty accessing chest reconstruction surgery, Spade explained 
that the medical community's resistance was in reaction to his rejection of an 
essentialized identity and his refusal to be identified within that paradigm. 131 Spade 
explained, "The fact that I don't want to change my first name, that I haven't 
sought out the use of the pronoun 'he,' that I don't think that 'lesbian' is the wrong 
word for me, or, worse yet, that I recognize that the use of any word for myself­
lesbian, transperson, transgender butch, boy, mister, FTM fag, butch-has always 
been/will always be strategic, is my undoing in their eyes."132 Spade's experience 
of his gender fits relatively neatly into jurisprudential protection of expression, as 
his self-understanding is inextricably bound with opposition to the canonical 
account. Paradoxically, while the highly politicized and strategic nature of his self­
understanding may make his expression more of a piece with that traditionally 
safeguarded by the First Amendment, it is precisely these qualities that may, as a 
pragmatic matter, result in rejection of protection by courts. 
Imagine Spade's statement within the symbolic speech rubric employed in 
Yunits. There is no real dispute that he had the intent to convey a particularized 
message, one of the two principal elements of symbolic speech.133 The question is 
126. Id. at *3. 
127. While this Article typically refers to plaintiffs by their last names, because "Doe" is a rather 
ubiquitous and hence more impersonal pseudonym, I refer to the plaintiff in Doe v. Yunits by her 
pseudonymous first name, "Pat." 
128. See, e.g., id. at *1 ("Plaintiffs treating therapist ... determined that it was medically and 
clinically necessary for plaintiff to wear clothing consistent with the female gender and that failure to do 
so could cause harm to plaintiffs mental health."); id. at *3 ("[P]laintiffs ability to express herself and 
her gender identity through dress is important to her health and well-being."). 
129. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *7. 
130. Id. at *3. 
131. Spade, supra note 65, at 21. 
132. Id. Spade now uses male pronouns and no longer uses his given first name. See id. at 19 n.14. 
FTM is an abbreviation for "female-to-male." 
133. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (finding that in determining whether conduct is sufficiently 
"communicative" the two principal elements are "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was 
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whether there was a great likelihood that the message was understood,134 given the 
arguable complexity of his expression. Case law, however, provides that the focus 
is simply on whether the overall theme or meaning of the expression as a whole is 
understood, rather than its particularities. \35 In this case, one need not ever have 
heard the terms "trans gender butch" or "FTM fag," or understand that Spade's 
inclusion of terms related to sexual attraction is an indicator of a multi-dimensional 
understanding of gender; all that needs to be understood is the primary message of 
gender non-conformity.136 As an initial matter, then, Spade's expression seems to 
be (and I would argue that it is) exactly the kind of symbolic expression that best 
serves the First Amendment's "high purpose" by inviting dispute and hence worthy 
of protection.137 
A primary obstacle faced by persons who experience their gender identity as 
grounded in opposition to the sex-gender paradigm, however, is the risk that courts 
may overlook precisely that which made Yunits successful-the court's 
understanding that the plaintiffs gender identity is a deeply felt and integral aspect 
of one's "selfuood."\38 In contrast with a medicalized account of gender, a court 
may dismiss the harm to Spade by discounting his experience as "mere" expression 
(cast, perhaps, as disruptive rebelliousness) rather than recognize that, as with Pat 
Doe, the harm to Spade is equally profound. This is due to the Ubiquity of the 
binarized, essentialized view of gender: that view is so widespread that it becomes 
canonical. As a result, a judge may be unable to recognize that her beliefs about 
gender are simply that-beliefs-a partial and incomplete view of gender rather 
than the sum total of gender itself. \39 I do not believe this will be fatal in all cases, 
however, particularly over time. Importantly, Spade's gender expression, in which 
present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who 
viewed it" (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-411 (\974»); see also infra notes 140­
145 (discussing symbolic speech more in depth). 
134. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404. 
135. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568 (\995) 
(finding that the message disfavored by parade organizers-that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or 
bisexual-was a "collective point" inherent in the "expressiveness of marching"); Yunits, 2000 WL 
33162199, at *4 (finding that the plaintiff's fellow students would likely understand the plaintiff's 
overall message: that she was more comfortable wearing clothes consistent with her female gender 
identity). 
136. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568; see infra notes 149-158. 
137. Johnson, 491 U.S at 408-09 (quoting Terminiel/o, 337 U.S. at 4). 
138. See Yuntis, 2000 WL 33162199, at *7 ("This court cannot allow the stifling of plaintiffs 
selfuood merely because it causes some members of the community discomfort."). 
139. See Barbara 1. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See"; White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 957 (\993) (discussing what the author 
terms the "transparency phenomenon," in which white persons' race is experienced as invisible to them 
because it is the presumed racial norm); see also Frances Raday, Culture, Religion, and Gender, I INT'L 
J. CONST. L. 663, 669 (2003) (noting that gender is a social construct and that social gender identity, 
resulting from this construct, is a product of the norms of behavior of men and women as defined by 
culture and religion); supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing how trans identity is based 
on being different from common understandings of gender norms, which begs the question as to what 
the norm is). 
490 TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:2 
dissent from the norm is an integral part of his gender identity, directly implicates 
core First Amendment values. 
For my part, my normative aspiration is for advocates to pursue claims both 
within and outside of a medical model. Given the widespread resistance to and 
reactiveness against gender variance, the vast majority of gender identity claims by 
trans individuals are unsuccessful; neither form of expression challenge is likely to 
change that course any time soon. All expression claims, but perhaps particularly 
those that directly reject a medical, binarized model may in the long-run serve a 
powerful purpose: chipping away at the dominant view of gender. Counsel must 
take care not to bring claims at the expense of the client by failing, for example, to 
make clear the barriers to success. But throughout social movements, individuals, 
particularly when represented by advocacy organizations, have recognized the 
value of taking the long view where civil rights and liberties are concerned. My 
hope is not only that some expression claims will succeed, but also that the act of 
bringing such claims over time will increase informed public understanding 
conceming the multi-faceted aspects of gender identity and the harms of state­
enforced gender orthodoxy. 
IV. LAWYERS' WORK: SYMBOLIC AND COMPELLED EXPRESSION 
In this Part, I address some of the doctrine-wrangling that is an inevitable 
component of expression claims, examining challenges based on symbolic and 
compelled expression. Both claims present significant challenges. I argue that 
they are important to bring nonetheless, because both accurately reflect the real life 
experience of many trans persons. The first-suppression based on the state's 
disagreement with the gender message expressed-is most likely to arise in the 
context of education and employment. The second-compelled expression and the 
forced disclosure of one's identity-is most likely to arise in the context of sex 
designations in government documentation over the individual's objection. 
Although there have been a handful of claims made on the former basis, I am not 
aware of any based on the latter. Again, assuming that the potential litigant is fully 
informed that such claims face (to put it mildly) an uphill battle in the courts, I 
argue that they are worth bringing. Both challenges articulate the nature of the 
injury that many persons currently endure in silence. 
A. Symbolic Expression 
Although the First Amendment has long protected a wide range of symbolic 
conduct, it is unsurprising that symbolic expression doctrine incorporates numerous 
gatekeepers, lest every form of conduct that has expressive implications (a political 
assassination, for instance) be protected by the First Amendment. Because the 
framework for making a symbolic expression claim is fairly straightforward, this 
Subsection focuses on three such gatekeepers: the assertion that the audience is 
unlikely to have understood plaintiffs message; the determination that the state's 
action was not aimed at suppressing expression; and the protection afforded 
employers and schools with respect to grooming and dress restrictions. 
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1. Gender as a Message Instantly Sent and Received 
Return for a moment to Pat Doe in Yunits, who made a symbolic speech 
claim.140 Pat's expression of her gender identity (through means including wearing 
skirts, jewelry, and other accessories deemed feminine) is not that different from 
symbolic expression already protected by the Supreme Court, such as wearing a 
black armband141 or flag patch on the seat of one's jeans. 142 In those cases, the 
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of protecting views which may make 
others uncomfortable or angry, as well as the First Amendment's role in guarding 
against state-enforced efforts to coerce conformity.143 Under a symbolic speech 
analysis, a court must determine whether the claimant had "[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message" and whether there is a great likelihood that the message 
"would be understood by those who viewed it."l44 As mentioned in Part III, the 
Yunits court found, with little apparent difficulty, that Pat was likely to succeed at 
establishing both elements at trial. 145 Before proceeding further, however, I would 
like to briefly address the contention made by the state in Yunits, and likely to be 
encountered in any symbolic expression challenge, that the plaintiffs message was 
not specific enough and that it was not understood. 146 
In contrast to wearing a black armband as a war protest, which has a relatively 
specific, pre-defined meaning, messages sent through gender expression may be 
complex. Was Pat, for instance, sending a message that she's female? Or 
trans gender? Or merely rebellious? As noted in Part II, similar questions may be 
even more likely to arise with respect to persons whose gender identities are non­
binarized (and therefore arguably less familiar to the general public).147 Such 
arguments are particularly likely in a school setting, given the young age of the 
students. The school in Yunits seized on this potential for complexity, as well as 
the students' youth, to argue that the students did not understand the complicated 
nature of gender identity. 148 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 122-130 (discussing a trans teenage girl, designated male at 
birth and diagnosed with gender identity disorder, who was effectively prohibited from enrolling in the 
eighth grade if she wore "girls' clothing or accessories" to school). 
141. Tinkerv. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
142. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 568 (1974). 
143. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09 ("Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble ... 
[and any] variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. ... But our Constitution says we must 
take this risk ... and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness­
that is the basis of our national strength ... [to] grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often 
disputatious, society." (citing Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4». 
144. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11). 
145. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing court's conclusion that "plaintiff's 
message clearly has been received"). 
146. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4. 
147. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing Dean Spade's declaration of his gender 
identity as an acceptance of a multitude of descriptors along intersecting axes of sex/gender and sexual 
orientation). 
148. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4. 
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The responses to this are at once doctrinal and pragmatic. The Supreme Court 
has determined that an overall message may be undeniably comprehensible even 
when not every component of the message is clearly communicated. 149 In the day­
to-day world, this conclusion is a sensible one. Consider Hurley v. Irish-American 
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group ofBoston, ISO in which the Court upheld a Saint 
Patrick's Day parade organizer's exclusion of an openly-gay Irish American 
organization from the contingents of marchers, despite a state law prohibiting 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 151 Even when there are smaller, and 
seemingly disparate pieces to a message-in Hurley, for instance, contingents ran 
the gamut from Miss Ice-O-Rama to "McGruff the Crime Dog"IS2-the Court's 
statement that "though the score may not produce a particularized message, each 
contingent's expression in the [organizer's] eyes comports with what merits 
celebration on that day"IS3 seems to be spot on. In Hurley, the overall message 
("what merits celebration") was clearly expressed by the organizer's choice of that 
which it determined did not merit celebration. 154 
Even though consideration of the individual components of the parade 
organizer'S message was not easily comprehensible, the message expressed by 
excluding the openly-gay contingent is undeniable. The contingent consisted of 
people marching behind a banner that read, quite simply, "Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston."15S This assertion of identity-much like 
the sandwich boards straightforwardly stating, "I AM A MAN"-is at once 
disarming in its simplicity and militarizing in its unvarnished demand for equality. 
As the majority in Hurley recognized, 
[A] contingent marching behind the organization's banner would at 
least bear witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or 
bisexual, and the presence of the organized marchers would suggest 
their view that people of their sexual orientations have as much 
claim to unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals ....156 
In gender expression cases, the "particularized message" likewise need not 
rise to the level of conveying a sophisticated understanding of gender identity or 
the more subtle aspects of an individual's identification.1S7 Instead, the message 
typically conveyed is simple, direct, and one we are attuned to immediately 
recognize. As in Hurley or as with the statements "I AM A MAN," or "Ain't I a 
149. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574. 
150. 515 U.S. 557. 
151. [d. at 573-75. 
152. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 
n.9 (Mass. 1994). 
153. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574. 
154. [d. 
155. [d. at 570. 
156. Id. at 574. 
157. For an example of more nuanced understandings of trans identities, see supra text 
accompanying notes 25-49. 
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Woman," the statement in gender expression cases is one of identity. 158 Pat Doe, 
for instance, was asserting, "I'm female," a message that is gender non­
conforming. 159 Trained as we are from an early age to categorize people as boys 
and girls, our reading of gender-and particularly gender variance-happens at the 
speed of light: instant messaging. As researchers explain, this process is automatic: 
When we come upon a person, many features of the target are 
rapidly encoded-size and shape, facial features and expression, 
clothing, and more. These features and the inferences drawn 
from them, allow, even require, perceivers to make quick 
assessments .... Among the most basic of such "person" features 
that are automatically communicated is a person's gender ....160 
Returning to the school's arguments in Yunits, while onlooking students may 
never have heard the term "trans gender" or be familiar with the complexities of 
gender identity, the eighth grader was not attempting to convey an understanding of 
the intricacies of gender identity; she was simply communicating her identity as 
female. 161 Significantly, it was not skirt or bra-wearing to which the school 
objected-students designated female at birth could wear these items as a matter of 
course. 162 Instead, much like the "I AM A MAN" sandwich boards worn by 
sanitation workers (all, crucially, male), it is the juxtaposition of the sign-whether 
sandwich board or skirt-in conjunction with the bearer's presumed anatomical sex 
that creates the message that is instantaneously sent and received. As discussed in 
greater detail in Part III, moreover, the state attempted to compel a counter­
message-a sign that in effect reads, "I'm male," expressed through the coerced 
wearing of pants as a condition of attending school. I63 
Especially in school settings, the government is likely to make the nested 
argument that even if plaintiffs message is understood, it is disruptive; in addition, 
the government may attempt to re-characterize gender expression as inappropriate 
sexual conduct. 164 As I have argued elsewhere, trans people, like those in other 
158. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 (commenting that GLIB wanted to participate in the parade "in 
order to celebrate its members' identity as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish 
immigrants"). 
159. See, e.g., Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (describing expression and identity of student at 
issue). 
160. Kristi M. Lemm et aI., Gender Picture Priming: It Works with Denotative and Connotative 
Primes, 23 SOCIAL COGNITION 218, 219 (2005), available at http://www.atypon­
link.com/GPI/doiJabs/10.1521/soco.2005.23.3.218 (follow "View PDF article" hyperlink). 
161. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4. 
162. Id. 
163. Id.; see discussion supra Part I1I.B (discussing facts of Yunits). 
164. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007) (stating school officials argued that a 
student held banner that read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" was disruptive because it promoted illegal drug 
use); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504-05 (presenting school official's argument that students' wearing of 
armbands as symbols of objection to conflict in Vietnam constituted a disturbance of school discipline); 
Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4-5. 
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marginalized groups, are hyper-sexualized.!65 Judicial opinions are replete with the 
fetishizing of trans individuals, typically adults; given the social anxiety about 
"protecting" children from sexual minorities and the school's judicially accepted 
role in instilling values, the risk of such conflation is presumably even greater in 
the context ofminors.!66 To the extent possible, I suggest confronting these issues 
in advance-perhaps in the complaint's discussion of gender identity (for example, 
by distinguishing it from punishable lewd conduct and by emphasizing the 
fundamental nature of gender identity to all persons); the Yunits opinion does a nice 
job of making these distinctions in an accessible manner.!67 
2. Aiming at (and Devaluing) Expression 
It is likely that the following quote from the Supreme Court's opinion from 
United States v. 0 'Brien!68 will appear prominently in any state briefing, whether in 
an education or employment setting: "We cannot accept the view that an apparently 
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging 
in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."!69 Given the necessity of line­
drawing, this statement is seductive. 0 'Brien itself, however, is cautionary. With 
the first two prongs!70 of the Court's test for symbolic expression met-David 
O'Brien sent, and there was a great likelihood that onlookers understood, the 
message expressed by the burning of his draft card on the courthouse steps-the 
Court asked whether the government's action was "directed at the communicative 
nature of [the] conduct,"!7! and rather facilely determined that it was not. 172 A 
response in the negative serves a sorting function by reducing rather dramatically 
(in effect, if not in articulation) the standard of review, all but ensuring that the 
state's action will be upheld.!73 
165. See Flynn, supra note 91, at 37-39 (discussing hyper-sexualization of trans gender claimants). 
166. See, e.g., Gay-Straight Alliance Network v. Visalia Unified Sch. Dis!., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 
1092-93 (E.D. Cal. 200 I) (involving a student-led organization of gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, 
and heterosexual students and the hostile environment created by teachers and administrators of the 
school district); Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4 (evaluating school officials' argument that 
transgender student's choice of attire was disrupting to other students); see also Anthony Niedwiecki & 
William E. Adams, Jr., Introduction, The Florida Example, 32 NOVA L. REv. 515, 516-17 (2006) 
(presenting Anita Bryant's arguments against homosexuality that focused primarily on preventing harm 
to children). 
167. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *5. 
168. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
169. !d. at 376; see also Spence, 418 U.S. at 409 (acknowledging this language from O'Brien as part 
of the protected expression analysis). 
170. The first two prongs are whether there was "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message" and 
whether there is a great likelihood that the message "would be understood by those who viewed it." 
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11). 
171. ld. at 406. 
172. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382. For instance, the Supreme Court accepted at face value the 
government's assertion that the draft card itself served an important government function in the 
administration of the draft, even though one could be inducted if the card itself was lost. ld. at 377-78. 
173. While the language of the standard to be applied when a court fmds that the government's action 
was not aimed at expression appears to be strong-for instance the incidental restriction on an 
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As arguably occurred in 0 'Brien, a court that devalues the expression at issue 
can fairly easily find that the government's action was not aimed at expression 
simply by adopting the government's articulated reason for its suppression. In 
gender expression cases, the best counterarguments are likely to be educational and 
factual. Concerning the former, the most important education for the court is for 
plaintiffs to convey the fundamental nature of gender expression and its centrality 
to one's well-being. Concerning the latter, it is rarely the case that the state is 
implementing a pre-existing policy; rather, it is more likely that an employer or 
school administrator has created an impromptu, one-of-a-kind policy in direct 
response to the plaintiffs non-conforming gender expression. Even if the 
government can point to a longstanding sex-differentiated dress code, its 
application to the plaintiff is usually far from evenhanded. The school district's 
reaction in Doe v. Yunits is illustrative. The district required Pat (and only Pat) to 
submit to daily clothing checks before being permitted to attend class, and 
subsequently implemented a policy prohibiting her from wearing girls' clothing or 
accessories. 174 The school district argued that it was impartially enforcing its 
prohibition of disruptive conduct. 175 Even assuming that the district would apply 
the same policy to others designated male at birth, however, it remains a policy 
aimed at non-conforming gender expression. As the court noted, those designated 
as female are permitted to wear the same items considered contraband for students 
deemed to be male. 176 
3. The "Appearance" Cases 
While the law has long protected a wide range of symbolic conduct, it 
routinely denies First Amendment protection to a subset of symbolic expression in 
the so-called "appearance cases," those challenging grooming or dress 
restrictions. 177 In the appearance cases, courts have sometimes undertaken the 
symbolic speech analysis above, but most frequently have circumvented it. 178 In 
Kelley v. Johnson,179 for instance, the Supreme Court rejected an officer's challenge 
to the police department's hair and sideburn length regulations, discussing First 
Amendment concerns only briefly.180 The majority opinion focused solely on the 
individual's First Amendment rights must be "no greater than is essential," O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, in 
practice this standard has been applied deferentially. For a critique of a 'Brien, see Pinard v. Clatskani 
School District 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 759 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006), declining to apply O'Brien finding it 
inapplicable in the Ninth Circuit with regards to school uniform cases. See also, e.g., Keith Werhan, 
The O'Briening ojFree Speech Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 635 (1987) (criticizing the application 
of the a 'Brien test to situations outside of its initially intended and narrow scope of application). 
174. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at ·2. 
175. Id. at ·4. 
176. Id. 
177. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245 (1976) (briefly discussing First Amendment issues); 
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507-08 (briefly discussing the expression related to dress and appearance). 
178. Kelley, 425 U.S. at 245 (focusing on power to regulate state employees); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 
507-08 (focusing on the need to maintain order and limit disruptive behavior in schools). 
179. 425 U.S. 238. 
180. Id. at 245. The Supreme Court primarily addressed the officer's Due Process claim, which the 
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state's power to regulate government employees' speech, without undertaking any 
analysis of the expression at issue-in fact, the message sent by the plaintiff was 
apparently so inconsequential to the Court that it never even mentioned what 
message the officer claimed he was expressing-gender non-conformity? affiliation 
with the youth counter-culture movement? religious belief? fashion? I 81 Similarly, 
the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines l82 protected the right of students to 
wear black armbands, but in an undeveloped analysis distinguished those facts 
from the "regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, ... hair style, or 
deportment."183 While not commenting further, the Court cited, with apparent 
favor, a Fifth Circuit decision that denied a First Amendment claim by male 
students who had been prohibited from enrolling in school because of their 
"Beatles" type haircuts. 184 The Court has not elaborated on the distinction, but 
implicit in its reasoning is a devaluing of appearance expression as unworthy of 
heightened First Amendment solicitude. 
As a robust body of scholarship has emphasized, appearance cases may 
implicate the expression of deeply-held identities, including those based on race, 
gender, sexual orientation, and religion. 18s The appearance cases, however, 
systematically devalue appearance as a mode of expression, despite-and perhaps 
because of-its centrality in our lives. As Karl Klare and others have noted, 
"[J]udges create a peculiar dissonance by trivializing appearance claims while at 
the same time asserting the need for the authorities to possess vast powers to 
enforce conventional attitudes and prejudices."186 The apparent paradox is easily 
explained. As their emphasis on the need of employers to enforce an orderly 
learning or work environment suggests, judges seem to realize the power of 
appearance expression to cause upset, disagreement, or tension. Trivializing 
appearance, then, serves two purposes: it allows the Court to avoid possible 
disruption and to maintain formal adherence to First Amendment principles-both 
without requiring the Court to make the difficult commitment of allowing potential 
disputes to arise. 
Court likewise rejected. Ed. at 249. 
181. Ed. at 247 (focusing analysis on "the county's method of organizing its police force, and the 
promotion of safety ofpersons and property"). 
182. 393 U.S. 503. 
183. Ed. at 507-08. 
184. Ed. at 508 (citing FerreIl v. DaIlas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697,701 (5th Cir. 1968». 
185. See. e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 255-56 (1989) (holding that sex 
discrimination was demonstrated by employer's suggestion, inter alia, that female employee dress more 
femininely to be considered for partnership position); Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 
1104, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that grooming policy of forcing female employees at 
casino to wear makeup did not constitute sex or gender discrimination); MarshaIl v. District of 
Columbia, 392 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (D.D.C. 1975) (rejecting argument that police department 
requireme!lt that officers be clean-shaven and have short hair infringed officer's First Amendment right 
to the free exercise of religion based on his religious vow not to cut his hair or shave his beard). 
186. Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REv. 
1395, 1401 (1992) (citing Mary Whisner, Comment, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in 
Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 73, 74 (1982». 
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The function served by the trivialization of appearance claims is evident, for 
example, in New Rider v. Board ofEducation. 187 The Tenth Circuit was able to 
ignore the school board's censorship of the students' expression of their Native 
American identity, as well as the political message inherent in their assertion of 
pride and equality, by characterizing the regulation as one that was simply about 
hair length, devoid of expressive meaning or impact. 188 In their dissent from the 
denial of certiorari, Justices Douglas and Marshall asserted that the students' 
message of "their pride in being Indian" was akin to pure speech, presaging the 
Court's recognition three decades later that an assertion of pride in gay and lesbian 
identity is expressive.189 By taking seriously the message expressed by the 
students, Douglas and Marshall shifted the focus to the State's use of its power to 
censor, referring to the school board's regulation as a "coercive assimilation 
policy"190 and an impermissible "effort to impose uniformity."191 While the 
significance of the students' speech in New Rider was evident to Justices Douglas 
and Marshall, the plaintiffs failed to convince the Court that the issue warranted 
Supreme Court review, just as the police officer in Kelley was unable to convince 
the Court that his expression through hair length warranted First Amendment 
protection. 192 Although trans plaintiffs certainly face an uphill battle, those who are 
able to convey to the court the fundamental nature of gender identity and its 
centrality to our health and well-being may be able to succeed where other so­
called "appearance" claimants have failed. 
B. Compelled Expression 
Just as the First Amendment protects the right to speak, it also protects the 
right to refrain from speaking. This does not mean that the government can never 
compel speech. It does so routinely, for example, by requiring citizens to speak 
through the filing of tax forms or court documents. But the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence has created a zone of protection for an individual's "sphere of 
intellect and spirit"193 by prohibiting compelled "affirmation of a private belief [ or] 
attitude ofmind."194 While an in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, 
I argue that when a state requires trans people to express a particular gender over 
their objection, it may in some instances constitute compelled expression of an idea 
with which they vehemently disagree. 
187. 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973). 
188. New Rider, 480 F.2d at 698 (reaffirming holding in earlier case which "explicitly held that the 
wearing of long hair is not akin to pure speech" (citing Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 
1971))). 
189. New Rider, 414 U.S. at 1099 (Douglas, 1., dissenting); see Hurley, SIS U.S. at 574 
(acknowledging the expressive elements of identity). 
190. New Rider, 414 U.S. at 1103. 
191. Id. at 1101. 
192. [d. at 1099. 
193. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
194. [d. at 633. 
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Consider Wooley v. Maynard,195 which involved a fonn of expression about 
which many of us would never give a second thought-Mr. Maynard's right to 
cover the words "Live Free or Die" on his New Hampshire license plate.196 The 
Supreme Court recognized that an individual's First Amendment interests are more 
deeply implicated if compulsion occurs on a repeated basis, and emphasized that 
the infringement caused by compelling Mr. Maynard to express a message with 
which he disagreed was more severe because of the ongoing nature of automobile 
197use. Calling Maynard's car a "mobile billboard" for the government, the Court 
stated, "[W]e are faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of 
his daily life-indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view-to be an 
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds 
unacceptable."198 
Since, for the majority of persons, gender identity is congruent with our sex as 
designated at birth, most of us likewise do not give compelled gender expression a 
second thought. Just as Mr. Maynard was required to express the state's message 
as a pre-condition for the routine use of his car, so trans people are required to 
express the state's sex-gender message as a pre-condition for engaging in a 
multitude of transactions that make up daily life. When the state requires that a 
student or one of its employees adhere to appearance standards based on that 
person's sex assigned at birth, she must spend eight hours a day interacting with her 
classmates or colleagues expressing a gender identity with which she deeply 
disagrees. Similarly, if the state prohibits changing the sex marker on a trans 
person's driver's license, she must express a gender message she opposes each time 
she engages in everyday transactions, such as opening a bank account, securing 
employment, purchasing alcohol or items by credit card, cashing a check, or 
responding to a traffic stop by the police. 199 In such situations, it is the trans person 
herself who has become the "mobile billboard" for the state's expression of its 
gender orthodoxy. 
One jurisprudential obstacle trans plaintiffs may encounter is the Supreme 
Court's distinction in Wooley between the use of government mottos (such as "In 
God We Trust," on American currency) from the one on Mr. Maynard's license 
plate. The Court suggested that the fonner do not pose constitutional concerns 
because the purpose of state seals "is not to advertise the message it bears but 
simply to authenticate the document by showing the authority of its origin."20o In 
195. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
196. [d. 
197. !d. at 715. 
198. [d. 
199. I am not arguing that the state is categorically prohibited from including sex markers on 
identification documents. It is likely that the state's interests (such as record-keeping, affirmative action 
programs, etc.) are sufficiently strong to allow it to record a sex designation, but that the interest fails in 
those circumstances in which the government insists on a particular sex marker over an individual's 
objection. It is not clear what potential remedies may be required by the First Amendment-the easiest 
resolution in the vast majority of cases is simply to utilize the sex designation with which the person 
identifies. 
200. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 n.11. 
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trans cases, the State may argue that the purpose of a sex designation in a birth 
certificate or driver's license is not to advertise a message, but to accurately 
identifY the individual. The State's position would be that the gender marker does 
not constitute expression and is merely the recordation of a fact. As discussed in 
Part II, however, the state is engaged in expression: it has selected one particular 
view of sex-as immutably fixed by one's birth designation-ignoring the large 
body of evidence demonstrating that gender identity (rather than genitalia) is the 
primary determinant of sex.201 
The message of a state motto such as that found on currency, moreover, is far 
removed from whatever the item's purpose may be (for example, to purchase 
goods). The Court in Wooley distinguished the use of a motto on a license plate 
from currency by emphasizing that a license plate motto is more likely to be 
associated with the car's owner because of an owner's frequent, personal, and 
public use of her car, whereas "currency ... is passed from hand to hand ... and 
need not be displayed to the public."202 Identification documents, in contrast, are 
uniquely associated with their bearer: their central purpose, in fact, is to identifY the 
individual to the world. Documents such as a driver's license, moreover, must 
frequently be displayed to members of the public as a pre-condition to engaging in 
many transactions that constitute part of daily life.203 
Finally, trans plaintiffs may be able to draw on the Supreme Court's 
anonymous speech cases. The Court has consistently struck down prohibitions on 
anonymous speech (such as leafleting), as well as state attempts to compel public 
disclosure of the identity of members of organizations (such as the NAACP) that 
are engaged in expression.204 Calling anonymity "a shield from the tyranny of the 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 76-82 (discussing an insistence on a fixed, essentialized 
view that one's gender at birth is one's gender throughout life). 
202. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 n.l5. 
203. Given the purpose of identity documents, the state is likely to assert its interest in preventing 
fraud. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting free exercise challenge to assignment of 
social security number based in part on state's interest in fraud prevention). Notably, however, the 
Supreme Court in Bowen ruled that there was no government compulsion in that case, emphasizing that 
assignment of the social security number was for the state's internal use, and distinguishing instances of 
compelled speech. ld. at 704-06. As discussed supra at notes 197-199, trans claimants have a strong 
argument that the government is engaging in direct compulsion of expression, similar to New 
Hampshire's insistence that Mr. Wooley express "Live Free or Die" whenever he would drive his car. 
Reliance on fraud prevention is further undercut by the ability to change the sex designation on many 
state and federal documents, combined with the less intrusive alternative of prohibiting fraud directly. 
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (applying exacting scrutiny, 
the Court invalidated a statute prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign literature); Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60, 63 (1960) (overturning ordinance forbidding the distribution of any handbills in 
any place under any circumstances if the handbills did not contain the name and address of the person 
who prepared, distributed, or sponsored it). 
204. See, e.g., Mclntyre, 514 U.S. 334 (prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign literature); 
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. at 63 (overturning ordinance forbidding the distribution of any handbills 
in any place under any circumstances if the handbills did not contain the name and address of the person 
who prepared, distributed, or sponsored it); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960) 
(holding that ordinance requiring disclosure and publication of NAACP membership lists violated the 
NAACP members' freedom of association); NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 
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majority," the Court emphasized the crucial role served by protecting the right to 
refuse to disclose one's identity when leafleting or as a member of a private (and 
typically unpopular) organization.205 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,206 
a 1995 decision striking down a ban on anonymous campaign literature, the Court 
stated, "[Anonymous speech] exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, 
and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from 
retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant 
society."207 Although political speech was at issue in McIntyre, the Court made 
clear that the motivation underlying an individual's refusal to disclose her identity 
need not be expressly political; it may be "motivated by fear of economic or official 
retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as 
much of one's privacy as possible."208 A trans person may be able to successfully 
argue that by requiring her identification to indicate her designated birth sex when 
it conflicts with her gender expression, the state is forcing her to disclose an 
unpopular identity that may subject her to harassment, discrimination, and violence. 
V. PINK ON PINK: NON-TRANS IDENTIFIED CLAIMANTS AND THE INVISIBILITY OF 

COERCED EXPRESSION 

It may at first seem paradoxical that gender claims (whether based in equality 
or expression) by non-trans plaintiffs at times fare worse than those by persons who 
are trans-identified. Consider a situation that one might believe is precisely the 
kind of harm that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Actz°9 would capture-an 
employer's insistence that women conform to traditional gender role stereotypes as 
a condition of employment. In Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating CO.,2IO the 
employer required female employees to undergo a makeover (with extensive 
requirements for make-up application, along with hair teasing and styling) and then 
held them "accountable," in essence, to their makeover photo through daily 
appearance checks; male employees were subject to minimal grooming standards 
(consisting of trimmed hair and nails) and were not required to conform daily to a 
makeover photo.211 The Ninth Circuit-which had been the first federal court of 
appeals to apply a gender role stereotyping rationale, albeit in dicta, to a trans 
person's claim of gender discrimination212-rejected Darlene Jespersen's claim, 
(1958) (holding that because the State failed to show a controlling justification for the deterrent effect on 
the freedom to associate, which disclosure of the membership lists was likely to have, the immunity 
from state scrutiny of membership lists, which the association claimed on behalf of its members, was so 
related to the right of the members to associate freely with others, it was well within the protection of 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
205. McIntyre, 514 U.s. at 357. 
206. 514 U.S. 334. 
207. Id. at 357. 
208. Id. at 341-42. 
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2006). 
210. 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), ajJ'd en bane, 444 F.3d 1104. 

21 I. Jespersen, 392 F.3d 1076. 

212. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) (ruling Gender Motivated Violence Act 
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twice, in its panel opinion213 and subsequently in a rehearing en banc.214 Unmoved 
by Jespersen's claim of harm-she testified that it made her feel "dolled up" and 
objectified, interfering so greatly with her ability to perform her job that she felt 
compelled to quit-and arguments that the requirements imposed on female 
employees were far more burdensome, the court ruled that although the burdens 
imposed were "different," they were not "unequal."215 
The majorities in both the Ninth Circuit's panel and en banc opinions appear 
to have been unable to take seriously the harm experienced by Jespersen, even 
though she quit her job of many years, for which she had consistently received 
glowing recommendations.216 The court stated, "This is not a ... requirement ... 
tending to stereotype women as sex objects."217 Instead, the court dismissed 
Jespersen's degradation as mere idiosyncrasy, concluding, "The only evidence in 
the record to support the stereotyping claim is Jespersen's own subjective reaction 
to the makeup requirement."218 The impediment for the court, I argue, is that make­
up wearing for women is so ubiquitous-such a part of the background-that its 
coerced expression, along with its power to objectify, are rendered invisible. As 
the dissent noted, "If you are used to wearing makeup--as most American women 
are-this may seem like no big deal."219 The majority appears unable to 
conceptualize make-up wearing as subordinating precisely because it is something 
that many of their wives, daughters, sisters, mothers (or, if female, perhaps 
themselves) wear routinely. The majority, in effect, is trying to read pink lettering 
against a pink background. 
The notion of losing sight of ubiquitous norms is a familiar one in critical race 
theory. Barbara Flagg, for example, discussed what she calls the "transparency 
phenomenon," in which white people do not view themselves in racialized terms 
because "whiteness" is the prevailing paradigm.220 The Second Circuit addressed 
the notion of the legibility of prevailing norms in a case evocative of a contrived 
law school hypothetical-a situation in which a female plaintiff wanted to conform 
to gender norms, but the government would not let her.22I In Zalewska v. County of 
Sullivan,222 Grazyna Zalewska, who had never worn pants at any time during her 
life, was a van driver required to wear pants; the state argued that it instituted the 
requirement in part because pants were less likely to get caught in the van's 
chairlift mechanism.223 After having been told that no exception to the uniform 
applicable to trans plaintiff by analogy to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which court reasoned 
applies to claims by trans individuals). 
213. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1083. 
214. Jespersen, 444 F.3d 1104. 
215. [d. at 1106. 
216. [d. at 1117-18 (Kosinski, J., dissenting). 
217. [d. at 1112 (majority opinion). 
218. !d. 
219. [d. at 1117-18 (Kosinski, J., dissenting). 
220. Flagg, supra note 139, at 957. 
221. Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2003). 

222.316F.3d314. 

223. [d. at3l7-18. 
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policy would be made for her, Zalewska nonetheless specially ordered a 
customized uniform with a skirt; when her employer ordered her to return the skirt, 
she refused.224 She was suspended for insubordination and ultimately was 
involuntarily transferred; she filed a claim alleging, inter alia, violation of her right 
of expression under the First Arnendrnent.22S 
The Second Circuit rejected the employee's claim, reasoning that her message 
was not understood because it was not sufficiently particularized.226 Why was her 
message lacking in specificity? Because, the court reasoned, Zalewska wanted to 
conform to gender norms, and gender conformity fails to send a message that 
others are likely to notice or understand: "[I]t is difficult to see how [the 
employee's] broad message would be readily understood by those viewing her 
since no particularized communication can be divined simply from a woman 
wearing a skirt."227 In fact, the Second Circuit distinguished gender non­
conforming expression, which it characterized as distinct and easily identifiable. 
Discussing the trans teen's claim in Yunits, the court stated that the teen's message 
"was readily understood by others . . . because it was such a break from the 
norm."228 Returning to Flagg's terminology, Zalewska's gender-conforming 
message, the court determined, is transparent against the backdrop of gender 
conformity. 
The facts of Zalewska, however, belie the notion that the employee's message 
was not understood. Zalewska's initial objection-combined with her special order 
of a skirted uniform and her subsequent refusal to return it, followed by her 
suspension for insubordination-leaves little doubt that her message was clearly 
communicated and understood. Zalewska, like Jespersen, sacrificed her job rather 
than conform to a gender presentation at odds with her identity. The difference in 
outcome from Yunits is that Pat Doe's gender identity was easy for the court to 
"read" because it stands out in contrast to the background norm. As discussed in 
the preceding Subsection concerning reliance on a medical model, Jennifer Levi 
suggested a somewhat different, although related, explanation of the same 
phenomenon: Levi attributed the relatively greater success of trans cases to 
humanizing the plaintiff through reliance on disability claims.229 I recognize, as did 
Levi, that reliance on a medical model may provide a vehicle that enables a court to 
understand the magnitude of the harm experienced. I additionally argue that 
shifting the focus to expression may open the door for non-medicalized claims as 
well. My hope is that expression claims by trans plaintiffs (whether or not 
medicalized) will assist courts in "reading" the background norms and hence the 
harm to all persons (whether or not transgender) when we are forced to express 
gender in a manner inconsistent with our gender identities. 
224. ld. 
225. ld. at 318. 
226. ld. at 319-20 
227. ld. at 320 (emphasis added). 
228. Zalewska, 316 F.3d at 320. 
229. See supra text accompanying notes 112-114 (discussing the humanizing effect of reliance on 
disability claims as a reason for the greater success of trans cases). 
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CONCLUSION 
Expression challenges, like all gender claims by trans litigants, present 
significant obstacles with minimal expectation of success. When appropriate for 
the plaintiff, however, I urge that such claims be brought. The most important 
reason for bringing such claims is, as the gendered claims for racial civil rights 
suggest, that expression of our gender is a fundamental aspect of our humanity. 
First Amendment claims, moreover, shift the focus to the state's reason for 
suppressing expression---often that the state itself is expressing contrary messages 
of gender subordination. In addition, expression may provide a more apt 
framework than equality for claims by trans individuals who experience gender 
outside of, and in resistance to a binarized, medicalized model. Finally, an 
understanding of gender as expression may make the harms of enforced gender 
conformity to non-trans claimants visible as well. 
